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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyzes the neoliberal governmentalities of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) and how they shape the policies, practices, and perceptions of poverty 
within the context of Namibia and its Vision 2030 policy.  Within this field, I emphasize 
that the techniques of partnerships, responsibilization, and benchmarking aim to shape 
particular spaces, and the individuals occupying them, and achieve millennial 
development targets and goals.  These neoliberal techniques guide the actions of the poor 
and shape ideas of poverty and poverty reduction, as well as legitimize the interventions 
of development and government institutions designed to manage the lives of the poor. 
 The ability for national and international actors to mold certain individuals into self-
regulating subjects is a crucial aspect in transforming social relations in the region and in 
understanding the strategies and activities associated with Vision 2030 and the MDGs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank Dr. Suzan Ilcan for providing her wisdom, guidance, reassurance 
and words of encouragement not only throughout my thesis research, but during my 
entire graduate career. I would also like to thank Dr. Tanya Basok and Dr. Anna 
Lanoszka for their advice and knowledgeable input. Also, thank you Kelley Allard for 
your assistance and consolation. 
 
Thank you mom, dad and Kelly, for keeping me focused and for always being proud of 
my achievements. Marie, your friendship was such a vital element in this process. And 
finally, thank you Derek for believing in me. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
AUTHORS DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY             iii 
ABSTRACT                  iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS                v 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION: “THE MILLENNIAL MOMENT”           1 
Methodology                                                  6 
II.   GOVERNING MILLENNIAL DEVELOPMENT:  
“FIRST THOUGHTS ON A SECOND COMING”             14 
Millennial Development as a Neoliberal Governing Apparatus:  
All Aboard for 2015                     29 
III.  THE “THREE FACES” OF MILLENNIAL DEVELOPMENT: 
PARTNERSHIPS, RESPONSIBILIZATION AND 
BENCHMARKING WITHIN THE MDGS              46 
Partnerships of the MDGs:  
“…where there is partnership, there are gains”                     46 
Responsibilization and the MDGs: “…we encourage people to take 
responsibility for their development and promote development 
activities that address the actual needs of the people…”              54 
Benchmarking the MDGs: “Progress is being made, but not fast 
enough to reach the MDG target[s]”                                            58 
IV.   NAMIBIA AND VISION 2030:  
“THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT”                       68 
Partnerships and Namibian Development: “one of the major 
principles upon which our Vision is based is ‘partnership’”         75    
Responsibilizing Namibians: “nation-building will be both a 
private sector (including civil society) and public responsibility”84 
Benchmarking Namibia: “Vision 2030 is expected to…move the 
nation significantly up the scale of human development…”         95 
V.    CONCLUSION            103 
BIBLIOGRAPHY                          107 
VITA AUCTORIS                123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction: “The millennial moment”1 
 
At this moment, there are 4 years, 250 days, 9 hours, 48 minutes and 55 seconds until the 
year 2015. What is the importance of this countdown? 2015 is the deadline for the United 
Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a globally applied framework which 
aims to solve the world’s development issues through quantifiable targets and deadlines. 
In this year, the world will come to realize how many people are poor, sick, 
malnourished, and underdeveloped and how many nations have failed in their ability to 
develop their country and to “make poverty history”. Billions of people will be affected.  
In order to achieve the time-bound goals of the MDGs, this framework needs to 
be applied to, and worked through, developing nations and their national development 
policies. I am interested in how the MDGs aim to ameliorate multiple, various and truly 
global issues as well as transform the developing world. The MDGs employ neoliberal 
practices and discourses in order to develop and shape African countries and individual 
behavior. I am interested in how this global framework and its neoliberal discourses have 
been integrated into national contexts. One of the countries that are currently in the grasp 
of this framework is Namibia. This country and its development plan Vision 2030 have 
been and continue to be technically managed and governed by the global framework of 
the MDGs. In order to demonstrate this argument, my analysis will attend to the 
                                                 
1 Comaroff and Comaroff. 2000. Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second 
Coming. Public Culture v.12(2), pp. 291-343 (quote located on pg.326). 
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discursive practices2 and technical procedures located within both global and national 
frameworks.  
My goal for this thesis is to ask how and to what extent millennial development3 
programmes govern national development policies, and how in turn, those national 
policies come to shape the individuals they aim to develop. These systems of governance 
engage with neoliberal techniques in order to manipulate, measure and manage poverty. 
In order to examine development as a technology of government, which shapes and 
directs individuals by producing remedies, expertise, and training, this thesis will address 
several questions: as regimes of practices and programmes seeking to create novel ways 
of thinking about and pursuing global development and poverty reduction, what “new” 
kinds of development strategies are envisioned through millennial development policies? 
Are these discursive strategies used as techniques within a larger global governing 
structure? What implications does the utilization of these discourses, and the forms of 
knowledge and ‘truths’ they produce, have for the framing and production of poverty and 
poverty reduction? In light of these questions, I acknowledge the relevance and 
importance of the development and governmentality literature, and of discourse analysis, 
in order to shed light on the governing strategies associated with poverty reduction within 
national and global millennial development practices. Examining neoliberal rationalities 
                                                 
2 Discourse is important to examine, since it structures practices and has very real effects, 
which shapes the world in which we live and how we interpret it (Ferguson 1990:18). 
3 Although I discuss what millennial development entails in Chapter 2, please see Ilcan 
and Lacey (2011), Ilcan and Phillips (2010) and Comaroff and Comaroff (2000) for an 
extended analysis. 
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within the context of development will demonstrate how the “new”4 and “unique” 
methods associated with the MDGs and Vision 2030 are merely methods of “governing at 
a distance” (Rose and Miller 1992; Dean 1999). I am aware of the limitations of this 
approach and how governmentality theory tends to disregard or discount agency. I 
acknowledge the fact that Namibians are fully conscious of, and involved in, the 
modification and transformation of millennial development practices and programmes. 
This thesis is going to examine the poverty reduction goals and strategies of the 
MDGs, and its neoliberal governing techniques of partnerships, responsibilization and 
benchmarking, in order to demonstrate how spaces5, and individuals within these spaces, 
are monitored against its strategies, targets and goals. The practice of partnerships has 
been revised and reinforced in development due to the influence of the World Bank’s ex-
President James Wolfensohn’s “Proposal for a Comprehensive Development 
Framework” (PCDF), which requests “a broader approach to partnership and to 
management of the development process’” (1999:21). According to this article, 
partnerships should: encourage government leadership, ownership and implementation of 
development policies and programmes; and align donor and recipient actions in order to 
maintain coherence and avoid duplication (ibid:24-27). Working with and through open 
and democratic concepts, and involving national governments and international 
                                                 
4 Duffield states, “what is singular about development is its institutional ability to both 
survive and prosper. Despite periodic crises of confidence, it unfailingly reinvents itself 
as ‘new and improved’” (2007:227). 
5 I understand space as “a political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, 
bordered, and controlled” (Elden 2007:578). 
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governmental organizations, donors, developing countries, academia and non-
governmental organizations legitimizes and justifies the presence of partnerships and 
hence development practices and programmes in developing countries. 
Responsibilization techniques are legitimized through the argument that  a less 
centralized system of development reflects the opinions and wishes of local communities, 
rather than those of politicians, or national and international agencies (Nekwaya 
2007:24). Considered to be one of the major “buzzwords”6 within development policy, 
this technique has very real effects upon our current understanding and portrayal of 
poverty and poverty reduction within millennial development policies. Drawing upon the 
notions of freedom and empowerment, it is not difficult to understand how and/or why 
this technique has been so easily implemented, yet, upon closer examination and 
consideration, this rationality has placed the accountability of development upon the 
shoulders of individuals in developing nations. Finally, the benchmark is a point of 
reference, located within a level plane, which measures performance and achievement of 
developing countries, by identifying disparate points and aiming to align them. This 
process has the ability to make visible development deficiencies and nonconformists. 
Typically, benchmarking involves two parties, the exemplar (demonstrator) and the 
anomalar (seeker). The goal is to not simply copy, but rather learn how to improve one’s 
performance through behavior modification, innovation and invention (Moriarty & 
Smallman 2009:486). I aim to contribute to the limited but nonetheless valuable literature 
                                                 
6 According to Cornwall & Brock, buzzwords “are an ever-present part of the world that 
are made and sustained by development agencies. They facilitate a multiplicity of 
contingent, situational and relational meanings…” (2005:1046). 
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on the governmentalities and discourses of the MDGs and (millennial) development as a 
whole by considering how these practices are not only utilized by the MDGs at a global 
level, but how they permeate and transform national policies and understandings of 
poverty and shape the actions of those considered to be poor or underdeveloped. 
I view the MDGs not as a neoliberal governing project per say, but rather as 
encompassing neoliberal “moves” and discursive practices which govern the modern 
developing subject and can be seen not only in the interconnections between the targets 
and goals of the MDGs, but also the application of the MDGs within specific national 
contexts. Promoted as “new” ways of knowing and conducting development, the MDGs 
govern the behaviour of individuals through self-reflection and self-mastery and contain 
“technical and institutional alignments” which generate global consensus, global ordering 
and global hierarchical arrangements (Craig and Porter 2006:4). Global ordering and 
global consensus building connects and binds the global to the national to the local. This 
connection produces “collective legitimization” (Death 2010:6) in the sense that the 
MDGs create and apply a solid global framework which is difficult to work against due 
to its all-encompassing nature. The sheer enormity and hegemonic power of the MDGs 
allows for the regulation of life, and the creation of subjects and citizens through a focus 
on subjectivities and aspirations, rather than through repression and control. Working 
through subjectivities justifies the presence and practices of the MDGs. The multiple and 
various linkages of the MDGs make this program a technology of governance par 
excellence.  
It must be stated however that the outcomes of development programs are not 
always bad; they often bring changes that people want (roads, infrastructure, health care, 
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etc.). Therefore, my goal is not to condemn the MDGs, for they are calling global 
attention to issues that billions of people are unfortunately experiencing. What I seek to 
understand is the rationale behind millennial development policies, what it seeks to 
change, how it seeks to change it, and the discourses and techniques it applies, and how 
these practices affect the populations they seek to change, as well as our understanding of 
development and poverty reduction. 
 
Methodology 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the neoliberal governmentalities of millennial 
development, and how these governmentalities shape the policies, practices and 
perceptions of poverty within the context of Namibia. The power and influence of 
millennial development policies lies in its neoliberal discursive practices which allow for 
the implementation and legitimization of practices and programmes to create a world 
without poverty. They are products of allied interests based upon and implemented 
through calculation, persuasion, and rhetoric and aim to fulfill the multiple objectives and 
targets of the MDGs. Discourse analysis will shed light on the specific forms of 
knowledge, conduct, and expertise associated with this millennial development 
framework and how it works as a technique of governance. It will allow for the 
acknowledgement of the problematic practices and assumptions located within 
development programmes.   
Discourse is a practice that influences ways and means of being and doing, and 
produces, influences and works through or within, social effects (Fairclough 2003:11). 
According to Fairclough, discourses represent the world in a particular way and 
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constitute “interactive processes of meaning-making” (ibid:10). However, it is highly 
dependent upon the audience’s ability to access, comprehend, and use the discourse, 
hence the prevalence of open, vague, and humanitarian7 undertones within much of the 
development discourse. An important aspect of this type of analysis is that discourse 
should not be considered in isolation because it acts upon and influences other discourses 
(ibid:3) in an act of intertextuality, meaning that specific discourses can only be and 
should only be understood with reference to other discourses (ibid:39-40). This is 
particularly evident with millennial development discourses, in that partnerships, 
responsibilization and benchmarking, although each powerful in their own right, work 
together in order to further solidify the development process. Examining specific texts 
and the social structuring of language are key to understanding the structures of social 
practices8 (ibid:3). Discourse figures in social practice in three ways: ways of acting, 
ways of representing and ways of being (ibid:26). In this sense, it is “inseparable from 
‘reality’ and embodies not only rhetoric and text, but also the actions of those actors 
employing discourses” (Mert 2009:109-110). Analyzing discourse allows one to focus on 
undetermined meanings, contestations and interpretations (ibid:110).  
Throughout the thesis, I have drawn upon particular African examples in order to 
demonstrate the importance and relevance of millennial development in this region, as 
well as to contextualize the development initiatives and issues occurring in Africa and 
                                                 
7 I am using humanitarian to describe the inclusive and pro-poor approaches to, and 
nature of, development. 
8 Social practices can be seen as articulations of different types of social element which 
are associated with particular areas of social life (Fairclough 2003:25). 
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Namibia in particular. Africa has bore the brunt of numerous development initiatives, yet 
it continues to be located within the global shadow as an “inconvenient continent”, since 
after decades of implementing various development initiatives, Africa continues to 
remain poor9 (Ferguson 2006b). The prevalence of poverty in the region legitimizes the 
presence and practices of dominant development organizations and developed Western 
nations who “deal with” or rather govern, dominate, restructure and authorize over Africa 
“by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, 
settling it, ruling over it…” (Said 1979:3). Discursive practices make such actions 
possible, allowing these spaces to be shaped and reshaped in order to fit the dominant 
practices at the time. This ability to govern is unacknowledged due to the ahistorical 
nature of development discourses which “obscures the political realities of the 
development industry” (Kothari 2005a:48). The discourses of development do not so 
much reflect reality, as it does construct it, which in turn, excludes alternative ideas and 
knowledges (Lie 2007:55). Development discourses have created and maintained “a vast 
institutional apparatus” which has very real and truly effective social, economic, cultural 
and political transformative forces (Escobar 2007:19).  
This thesis sheds light on the ability and power of discourse to restructure social 
relations within millennial development, and how they contribute to the process of 
meaning making. I will specifically examine the effects of the discourses of partnerships, 
responsibilization and benchmarking in Namibia. These concepts excel at molding and 
                                                 
9 For instance, globally, the number of people living on less than $1 per day declined 
from 1.281 billion to 1.089 billion; in Sub-Saharan Africa, the amount increased from 
227 million to 313 million (Hanjra 2008:185). 
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shaping individuals due to their vagueness and ambiguity, which generate a sense of 
compromise to allow for the application, enrolment, and hence success of neoliberal 
governing techniques and discourses in developing regions (Mosse 2005:230). I have 
chosen to examine Namibia not only because it was a key player in the design and 
implementation of the MDGs, but also because Namibia is among the very few countries 
which has experienced the apartheid10, was the second last African country to gain its 
independence11 and is infamous for having the highest levels of inequality in the world. 
Considering the issue of independence, it is important to keep in mind that, in Africa, 
domination has been exercised by entities other than the state, such as transnational 
organizations (International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and UN) that are not in 
themselves governments, but work with First World states. These organizations impose 
development strategies (macroeconomic interventions, curtailing social spending and 
restructuring state bureaucracies, etc.) leading to an erosion of the sovereignty of nation-
states. Such governance represents a kind of transfer of sovereignty away from African 
states into the hands of international governing bodies (Ferguson 2006b:100). Not only 
has Namibia gained independence from South Africa, only then to be governed by 
international development organizations and financial institutions, but independence also 
nationalizes the issue of poverty and inequality, and makes it an attribute of the country, 
rather than as an effect of its history as a colony, or as recipient of apartheid ruling 
                                                 
10 Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa are the only countries in Africa which directly 
experienced the apartheid. 
11 Namibia gained independence March 21, 1990 and the state of Eritrea gained 
independence May 24, 1993. 
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(Ferguson 2006b demonstrates this issue in his examination of Lesotho). I believe these 
issues make Namibia an interesting and unique case study in the context of millennial 
development and will provide a fascinating analysis of the implementation and effects of 
millennial development governmentalities, neoliberal rationalities and discursive 
practices.  
In order to examine the discourses of millennial development programmes and 
policies, I analyzed relevant and contemporary research reports, documents, UN 
statements and development plans on the MDGs and Namibia’s Vision 2030 to highlight 
the UN’s ability to “govern at a distance”.  Working with and through a governmentality 
lens was quite challenging since little critical research exists for this region. Of note is 
Ilcan and Lacey (2011), who’s work on Namibia and the Solomon Islands sheds light on 
the neoliberal reforms promoted by aid programs which govern the poor through the 
concepts of privatization, empowerment, and partnership. My contribution to the 
development literature furthers this analysis on Namibia, by examining not only how 
millennial development and its neoliberal discourses of partnerships, responsibilization 
and benchmarking, govern the poor at a global level (through the MDGs), but also how it 
is applied and works to govern at a local level (through Namibia’s Vision 2030). I 
consider how these discourses work to not only shape our understanding of the poor and 
poverty reduction, but also how the governmentalities of millennial development shape 
the poor into becoming the perfect neoliberal citizen. I relied heavily on the Google and 
Google Scholar search engines in order to find various documents on Namibia as well as 
Namibian government policies. I also relied on government websites, UN websites and 
articles, and commentaries in The Namibian, one of the country’s main newspapers.  
11 
 
The principle data sources used for this analysis include: United Nations (2010) The 
Millennium Development Goals Report 2010 which provides the latest information on 
data gathered on the MDGs; the National Planning Commission’s (2008) 2nd Millennium 
Development Goals Report: Namibia 2008, Progress at Mid-Term 1 September 2008 
offers a regional interpretation and application of the MDGs in Namibia; Government of 
the Republic of Namibia (2004) Namibia Vision 2030: Policy Framework for Long-Term 
National Development, and the National Planning Commission website 
(http://www.npc.gov.na/vision/vision_2030bgd.htm), supply the discourses that work to 
legitimize the practices of the MDGs and of Vision 2030; Frayne (2000) and Melber 
(2005) provide a poverty profile and give a brief history of development planning in the 
region, as well as the effects of apartheid, and post-colonialism; Mabizela (2005) and 
Marope (2005) provide information on educational transformations occurring in the 
country and the need for Namibians to be involved in the creation of a knowledge-based 
economy; finally the Bank of Namibia’s (2008) 10th Annual Symposium Publication 
makes available the information on structural transformation, economic growth and 
policy options for Namibia.  
In addition to these documents, relevant websites for analysis include: The United 
Nations End Poverty 2015 Millennium Campaign website 
(http://www.endpoverty2015.org/); United Nations Development Programme website 
(http://www.undp.org/mdg/); United Nations We Can End Poverty 2015 Millennium 
Development Goals website (http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/); the National 
Planning Commission website (http://www.npc.gov.na/); and the Republic of Namibia 
Vision 2030 website (http://www.grnnet.gov.na/aboutnam.html). These key sources 
12 
 
provided me with information and documents which allowed me to examine descriptions 
and understandings of poverty at both a global and national level, and how the neoliberal 
discourses of partnerships, responsibilization and benchmarking legitimize, describe and 
connect poverty to local and global development programmes, policies, practices and 
solutions.  
Internationally, poverty is understood or portrayed as a monetary issue. This 
quantitative understanding of poverty depoliticizes and localizes the issue of poverty. 
Rather than considering specific contextual concerns, “the poor” are not only generalized, 
but are shaped into citizens that can eliminate their own poverty through various 
techniques and practices. Considering poverty in Africa, it is not uncommon to discuss 
macroeconomic instability, geography, ethnic fractionalization and conflict, poor 
policies, poor government, weak institutions, or low human capital (Bigsten and Shimeles 
2007:162), rather than the systemic and structural effects of colonialism, racism, 
neoliberalism, and the imperialistic practices of development and financial institutions. 
Applied at a national level, poverty in Namibia is seen as a consequence of high rates of 
unemployment, population growth, rural to urban migration, as well as the inability of the 
economy (Frayne 2004:490). This understanding complements the global perception of 
poverty as an economic and monetary issue. However, at a local level, Namibians are 
aware of the influence that South Africa had and continues to have over the country 
(Klerck 2008:358) which creates various barriers for Namibians in their economic 
activities and developments (Knutsen 2003:555). What this basic description of poverty 
demonstrates is the influence that global understandings of poverty have over national 
13 
 
assessments, as well as how this blanket approach obfuscates the causes and concerns of 
the poor at local levels. 
The following chapter asks how and to what extent millennial development 
programs engage in techniques to shape, measure and govern poverty. I aim to examine 
development as a technology of governance that shapes and directs individuals by 
producing remedies, expertise, and training and I aim to demonstrate how this governing 
technology operates through neoliberal rationalities of governance.  
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Chapter 2 
Governing Millennial Development: “First Thoughts on a Second Coming”12 
 
The processes and practices of millennial development13, rather than sustaining the harsh 
top-down economic restructuring practices of the Structural Adjustment era, has begun to 
incorporate and promote (social) innovation, improved services, as well as aiming to free 
individuals from their surrounding social, political and economic environment. This form 
of development appeals to the individual since people are now empowered and involved 
in the development process. There are contradictions however, in the sense that 
development includes recipients but marginalizes their ideas and concerns, produces 
desire for development but decreases certainty, magnifies difference but undercuts 
consciousness (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000:298). Rather than focusing on 
egalitarianism, individuals are left to fend for themselves in trying to “clamber aboard the 
good ship Enterprise” without the necessary resources to work within the current 
economic order (ibid:299). Such a framework not only places blame upon the individual, 
but it also perpetuates and has the ability to create and constantly reinforce a dichotomous 
understanding of the world: “us” and “them”, “developed” and “underdeveloped”. 
“Millennial development” promotes a more inclusive, pro-poor and humanitarian 
                                                 
12 Comaroff and Comaroff. 2000. Millennial Development: First Thoughts on a Second 
Coming. Public Culture v.12(2), pp.291-343. 
13 According to Sachs the process encounters “the most challenging development 
questions of our generation” (2005:x). The MDGs represent a “‘global effort’ in the 
service of a greater global cause…” and are truly “a labour of love” (ibid). 
15 
 
practice, in that it works on and through the involvement, aspirations and capabilities of 
the poor rather than the application of objective and highly economistic and scientific 
policies of prior decades. However, the process continues to work through the concepts 
of progress, improvement and modernization, which maintain the classifications of worse 
or better, and inferior or superior and tends to echo the not so distant imperialist past 
(Goudge 2003:202, Ferguson 1990:15). It is important to challenge these dichotomies, for 
they have very real effects upon regions, communities14, and individuals.  
Perhaps the most evident and truly unfortunate example of the effects of 
development dichotomies is the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Long and Mills (2008) have 
recently examined the outcomes, actions and inactions resulting from imperialist and 
colonial legacies (ibid:390). The extremely profound and powerful implications of such 
legacies lead international organizations to be unable to see beyond colonial binary 
oppositions (ibid:390). This issue is demonstrated by the complicity of the UN Security 
Council with the genocide of 1994. Rwandans were translated or portrayed as “black, 
impoverished and…of little interest…” (ibid:404), which in turn rationalized the inaction 
of the UN (ibid:405). Member states subordinated Rwanda’s need for assistance through 
independent decisions and considerations about political and strategic best interests 
which de-legitimized Rwanda’s need for assistance due to its portrayal of lacking any 
form of  “significant strategic value for the developed world” (ibid:404). The ability to 
portray Rwandans as inferior or backward legitimized the translation of Rwandans as 
                                                 
14 I use community in its most basic sense, which “implies relations that give identity and 
meaning to its members” (Mathie and Cunningham 2008:6). 
16 
 
“tribal members at war who simply needed to heed their own peace agreement”, rather 
than as a humanitarian or genocidal event (ibid:401). 
Furthering the issue of development dichotomies, one may consider the Epupa 
Falls Dam Project in Namibia. Located along the Cunene River, this project has been in 
negotiations since the 1990s, and appears to be in the final stages of discussion. In order 
to generate electricity for homes, and to also stimulate and attract an international 
business sector, the country has decided that harnessing hydro power is the most 
compatible option. Unfortunately, this project will create severe consequences for the 
Himba pastoralists in the surrounding region, particularly due to the loss of Epupa falls, 
biodiversity, and ancestral graves. The loss of these cultural and social aspects will have a 
significant impact on Himba identities, lifestyles and production systems (Corbett 
1999:5-6). Not only will the Himba become more dependent on the economic and social 
security of the state (ibid:8), they will also be exposed to a higher incidence of malaria 
due to the still or slow moving water of the dam (ibid:10). Although the project is 
associated with job creation, the majority of the Himba will not secure employment due 
to a lack of “marketable skills” and lack of proficiency in English leading them to 
gravitate towards informal settlement patterns around the construction town, increasing 
the risk of crime, alcoholism, prostitution and disease (ibid:11).  
Although the damn project is considered to advance Namibian development, it is 
having negative consequences for the Himba who live in the surrounding region. 
Unfortunately, due to their portrayal as tribal, inferior, and possibly backward, the Himba 
have not been consulted by the government or project managers or involved in the 
development process, nor have had their needs attended to. The Himba know that their 
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concerns will be overlooked and they will not be able to have a say in the project (ibid). 
This issue is clearly stated in Councilor Tjitaura’s (Headman under Chief Kapika) 
address the Namibian government: 
Government, how is it that you only reckon with those who are educated like 
yourselves and you don’t consider those who are not? The only way out of this 
debacle is to understand that independence and freedom are meant for a person 
who wears modern garments and not for a Himba like myself 
(5minMedia 2010: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xg26jt_himba-people-
fighting-against-the-epupa-dam_people) 
Dichotomous understandings produced by/through development alter images and 
perceptions of individuals and communities in negative and condescending ways. As seen 
in the Epupa Falls Damn project, the need to be modern does not necessarily benefit 
those who are deemed to be not modern, hence the need to be aware of the practices and 
(un)intended consequences of development and the application of the term 
underdevelopment. 
To be labeled as underdeveloped not only sheds light on actual inconsistencies 
and inequalities located within various spaces throughout the world, but it also places a 
particular space within a solidified and hegemonic development apparatus, consisting of 
programmes and policies aimed at correcting this dilemma. There are many signs and 
signals of underdevelopment which particularly concern the lack of: skills, capacity, 
freedom, creativity and material well-being, modern institutions and efficient 
technologies, services, amenities and forms of assistance, transportation, communications 
and public administration, as well as minimal standards of housing, education, food, 
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water, and health/health care (Udombana 2000:755-56). In this sense, to be developed, or 
underdeveloped, “encompasses all aspects—economic, technological, organizational, and 
managerial” as well as spiritual and material (ibid:757). Alongside acting as a method of 
description, it is also used as a method of comparison which distinguishes between and 
hierarchically categorizes the most to least developed (ibid:757). 
The United Nations have been particularly influential addressing and dealing with 
underdevelopment by implementing “painful adjustments”, transformations and a “total 
restructuring” of society in order to develop and to achieve “material prosperity and 
economic progress” (Escobar 1995:4). The idea and teleological process of development 
has created and “produced its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, 
untold exploitation and oppression” (ibid:4). Producing and creating an underdeveloped 
individual or region creates an “underdeveloped subjectivity” which is a universal and 
homogenous conception of individuals who are labeled and specified as powerless, 
passive, poor, and ignorant, “usually dark and lacking in historical agency…hungry, 
illiterate, needy, and oppressed by its own stubbornness, lack of initiative, and traditions” 
(ibid:8). This descriptive and comparative process signifies the dominance over 
“developing” spaces, rather than its actually existing realities (ibid:9). Informed and 
defined by types of knowledge, systems of power, and forms of subjectivity (ibid:10) is 
what makes development and underdevelopment true apparatuses of governance. 
Development organizations, policies and programmes perceive the causes and 
effects of underdevelopment as “an object, a fact” (Esteva 2003:11). It is a comparative 
adjective whose base of support is the Western, and highly unacceptable and 
indemonstrable assumption of a homogenous and “linear evolution of the world”; it 
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disconnects the multiple and various interconnections of the globe (i.e. economic, social, 
political relations) and instead, “substitutes one of its fragments, isolated from the rest, as 
a general point of reference” (ibid:11-12). Take into account the issue of poverty, 
whereby rather than considering or referencing regional or national contexts, or the 
multiple and various forms of poverty, the actors of millennial development have instead 
quantitatively generated who and how many poor people there are globally, based upon 
income. While these global commitments have accorded poverty reduction exceptional 
attention, the majority of the programs geared toward “making poverty history” tend to 
mask contextual concerns15. The application of these strategies tends to create or 
maintain spaces of “underdevelopment”, filled with poverty, war and disease.  
By far one of the most well known and visible spaces of underdevelopment is 
Africa. This space tends to carry a double message: that this unjust suffering should be 
repaired, but that “this sort of thing” happens “over there” as an inevitable tragedy of the 
ignorant, the simple and the uncivilized (Sontag 2003:71; Ferguson 2006a:19). The 
continent is discussed in urgent tones pertaining to its crises, problems, failures and moral 
                                                 
15 In order to address the causes and consequences of poverty, and those living within it, 
we must expand our current understanding of poverty; it is not simply a matter of 
material deprivation, but also social exclusion, inadequate opportunities, marginalization, 
and vulnerability (Woolcock 2009:9; Craig & Porter 2005:239). Although there is some 
mention or understanding of poverty as a lack of basic human needs (such as the case 
with the UNDP who employ “the notion of ‘human poverty’, measured in terms of 
education, health [and] housing…”), it appears that the most common measure of poverty 
is monetary poverty (Pieterse 2002:1025). 
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challenges, which allow Western societies to portray and describe Africa as a radical 
underdeveloped other, hence creating, implementing and justifying further development 
strategies and programmes.  
Conceiving of Africa as underdeveloped allows for certain forms of development 
programs to be located within many African countries which may not necessarily address 
the issues of poverty within that region. For example, Kotir and Obeng-Odoom consider 
the increasing presence of microcredit projects in the Lawra-Nandom district in Ghana 
and how although there are cases where microcredit initiatives alleviate monetary poverty 
and generate high levels of employment and development, there are other cases which 
suggest a worsening of poverty (2009:85). An estimated seventy percent of the region is 
living below the poverty line of ¢900,000.00 (about US$100) per adult per year (ibid:90). 
Citizens here are highly dependent upon agriculture, but the increasing risks associated 
with this occupation (low soil fertility, population density, low levels of investment, low 
returns) have lead individuals to search for alternative occupations and sources of 
income. Due to this changing economic environment, many microcredit institutions have 
been established in the region (ibid:90) which charge two to eighteen percent interest and 
give money “often on condition that the borrower can provide collateral security” which 
can vary from ones house, land or livestock, to cars or jewelry (ibid:96); unfortunately, 
resource-poor households are at a serious disadvantage with this aspect (ibid:96).  
Although this type of project can temporarily improve one’s quality of life, it may 
also increase one’s debt if they are unable to repay the loan (ibid:96). Interestingly, thirty-
five percent of respondents stated the loans did not contribute to community development 
and twenty percent stated they were not sure if it did. This may indicate that microcredit 
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may not necessarily equate with development or poverty reduction (ibid:99) since it 
appears that microfinance programs may only perpetuate poverty leading to the creation 
and implementation of newer development projects. Applying or implementing 
development projects which are not based upon the contextual causes of poverty may 
create more rather than less poverty. This inability to address the issue of poverty tends to 
perpetuate the discussion of the continent in urgent tones pertaining to its crises, 
problems, failures and moral challenges, which allow Western societies to portray and 
describe Africa as a radical underdeveloped other, hence legitimizing the creation, 
implementation and justification of further development strategies and programmes 
which again may not necessarily address the underlying contextual issues of poverty. 
Focusing on educational development and reform projects within developing African 
countries, Bosu et al (2011) examine a stifling universalist education framework within 
the Ghanaian and Tanzanian context. The millennial development programmes 
implemented in these countries emphasize a homogenous educational system which does 
not take into account context or “local educational mores” (ibid:67). Teachers are 
provided with highly structured and quite lengthy handbooks which promote bureaucratic 
compliance and stifles individual agency (ibid:71). The greatest concerns in the Ghanaian 
and Tanzanian context are community and family poverty, poverty reduction and gender 
disparities (ibid:67). Rather than focusing on teenage pregnancy (sexual knowledge), teen 
drop-out rates, social and cultural stigmas (ibid:72) or poverty and the hardships that 
children have to endure within such situations (ibid:74), the framework promotes a 
depoliticized, decontextualized and marketized curriculum which does not address the 
issues at hand in these countries; instead, it places blame on the individual, rather than on 
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larger systemic or structural issues. In this case, without addressing the concerns of 
Ghanaians or Tanzanians, development projects will fail to provide the changes that are 
needed and wanted in the region, leading to further implementations and embeddings of 
development projects. In this sense, development is the solution to its failure. 
Although there have been numerous development programmes implemented in 
Africa, focusing on children, health, gender, post-conflict reconstruction, etc., socio-
economic discrepancies continue to exist16. What justifies this unsuccessful, 
unrepresentative and biased process is the failure of development. Failure legitimizes 
development’s continued presence upon the global stage, allowing it to generate new 
forms of intervention, policies and practices (DeVries 2007:34) for the purpose of 
identifying and correcting “newly created” deficiencies (Li 2007:19). Placed within the 
context of millennial development, the failure of previous development programs has 
legitimized the implementation of current programs on a global level. The “new” and 
“unique” nature associated with this framework appeals to our need for a better, modern 
and perhaps more humanitarian, approach to development. In this sense, failure has been 
transformed into a “motor”, rather than as a deterrence, for the reproduction of 
development. It is through such critical understandings of development that Ferguson 
(1990) has labeled the process as an “anti-politics machine”, in the sense that the 
detachment from previous practices, experiences and failures not only depoliticize 
development, but also decontextualizes or desystematizes issues located in the 
development process which in turn leads to the maintenance and possible enhancement of 
                                                 
16 Whether or not these discrepancies exist despite development or because of 
development can be debated. 
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its power (270). Failure allows for the creation of new rationalities, governmentalities and 
technologies which allows development to be such an effective “instrument of 
domination” (DeVries 2007:34) and technique of governance. 
Foucault has broadened the operation of the practices of governance by pushing 
the idea of governmentality outside of the nation-state and applying it within new 
theoretical and political territories. Due to his interest in political rationalities, the 
genealogy of the state, and the genealogy of the subject, Foucault came to formulate the 
theoretical framework of governance and governmentality in order to analyze the 
connections between technologies of the self and technologies of domination. He shed 
light on the fact that in order to these technologies, one must consider the political 
rationalities that constitute and fortify them in order to acknowledge the link between 
forms of power and processes of subjectification. In his genealogical method, Foucault 
demonstrated how government entails management, self-control, guidance, and direction, 
leading him to define government as conduct, or as "the conduct of conduct" which 
ranges from governing the self to governing others. The key concept of governmentality 
plays a critical role in Foucault’s analysis of power due to the fact that it can link 
technologies of the self with technologies of domination, and demonstrate that power can 
exist and work without violence (see Foucault 1980, 1990, 1991, 1995, 2003, 2007, 
2008). 
It is this idea of power beyond the nation-state that is quite relevant in examining 
millennial development programmes, for one can now relate governmentality to the 
international, the global and the supra-national (Larner & Walters 2004). For example, 
Ilcan and Phillips (2010) focus on the governing discourses of millennial development 
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programmes which they state “enable[s] new ways of shaping social and economic affairs 
in the field of development…” (844). They consider the developmentalities of the MDGs, 
a form of governmentality, which recast and reformulate development problems and 
solutions by relying on three forms of neoliberal rationalities of government: information 
profiling, responsibilization, and knowledge networks, and their calculative practices. 
These rationalities work to not only “shape global spaces” but also formulate “new 
capacities” for individuals and groups (ibid:844). 
Governmentality prompts individuals to consider how governing involves 
particular methods, representations, knowledges, expertise, calculations and 
measurements, types of authority, practices, policies and programmes, techniques 
(interviews, case records, brochures, manuals) and vocabularies regarding that which is to 
be governed. They shape and govern conduct, and aim to bring about productive social 
change by working through the desires and aspirations of those who are governed and 
allow organizations to legitimately intervene within particular spaces in multiple and 
varying ways (Rose et al. 2006; Wilson 2006; Larner & Walters 2004, DeVries 2007:34). 
Merlingen (2003) describes the governmentalities of international (development) 
organizations best, in that it is “conceptualized as ubiquitous in presence, microphysical 
and diffuse in nature, circulating in movement and producing countries, civil societies 
and individuals in its effects” (370). For example, the governmentalities of partnerships, 
responsibilization and benchmarking are fluid, apolitical and ahistorical in nature, 
allowing them to not only be applied everywhere and anywhere, but also transform the 
people and places where such rationalities are located. These techniques govern the 
actions of the poor and ideas of poverty and poverty reduction due to their elusive nature.  
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Development governmentalities facilitate the emergence and proliferation of the 
governing arrangements of international agencies in the form of policy-making and 
administration in the economic sphere and self-managing in the public sphere 
(Swyngedouw 2005:1992). Although there are many benefits working with and through a 
governmentality framework, there are also limitations. It is important to be aware of the 
fact that governmentality theory obfuscates agency. I acknowledge the fact that 
Namibians are fully conscious of, and involved in, the modification and transformation of 
millennial development practices and programmes and are not idly accepting the ideas 
and portrayals of poverty and underdevelopment put forth by millennial development 
policies.  
The governmentalities of the MDGs are technocratic in nature and place a great 
deal of emphasis upon local or individual “deficiencies”. Technocratic remedies define 
and make visible the boundaries of spaces by transforming the space into “an intelligible 
field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics…” which can be assembled or 
placed within particular development techniques (Li 2007:7). The ability to locate 
deficiencies within clearly defined spaces creates, maintains and legitimizes the 
implementation of development policies and programmes. Creating and defining spaces 
makes certain problems “thinkable and governable” (Phillips and Ilcan 2004:395) and 
enables the creation of “subjects” of development who can be, and are, “targets of the 
technologies of development” (DeVries 2007:35). Technocratic development does not so 
much seek solutions, as it gives “problems” a visible, actual, and authentic reality; it is 
through this “illuminating” strategy that particular treatments and observations are 
implemented (Escobar 1995:42). These solutions legitimize development through its 
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emphasis on and production of new and advanced knowledges, languages and methods 
(Kothari 2005b:428).  
The technocratic practices of the MDGs reframe context specific issues and 
realities and place them within a decontextualized and hence depoliticized global 
framework (Woolcock 2009:11, Wilson 2006:502). This is currently being witnessed in 
Uganda with its Poverty Eradication Action Plan. Although there has been recent success 
in the country with its poverty reduction strategy, there are concerns that the poorest have 
been left out of the process and have benefitted little. The technocratic languages and 
discourses located within the policy framework are geared toward the “economically 
active”, hence excluding the poorest individuals from the process (Hickey 2005:995). 
What has resulted is the under- and misrepresentation of Uganda’s poorest groups within 
the global and national poverty reduction policies and projects (ibid:995). This 
technocratic agenda has “prioritize[d] the technical over the political, and focus[ed] on 
state efficiency, rather than issues of ‘state reform’ or ‘social and political change’” 
(ibid:996). Another example of the technocratic practices of development can be seen in 
the Millennium Villages project17. According to Ilcan and Phillips (2010), technical 
assistance is being provided by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in virtually 
                                                 
17 The Millennium Villages project is led and executed by the communities on the ground 
in Africa. The overall aim is to make an investment toward a sustainable end to extreme 
poverty and for communities to strengthen their local governments and institutions and to 
ensure that their development will become sustainable and self-sufficient 
(http://millenniumvillages.org/about/). 
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every region of the world in order to enhance the capacity of governments and groups to 
collect statistical information ranging from gender, to agriculture, to education (858). 
These technical procedures are creating spaces of development, as seen in the idea that 
villages “can escape poverty by identifying their problems and transforming themselves 
to meet the MDGs” (ibid:858). Populations within these villages are not only “made 
responsible for choosing the most ‘powerful, practical technologies’ that will dissociate 
themselves from their impoverishment”, but they are also on the receiving end of self-
problematizing critiques, which can result in “discoveries of new ethical politics and 
newborn identities” (ibid:858). The technocratic tendencies associated with development 
are now an omnipresent reality, whereby poor countries are now subject to numerous 
programs, calculations and interventions, dictated by supranational institutions and 
development experts (Escobar 1988:430) which may not always provide the solutions 
needed and may possibly complicate matters further. Technocratic, economistic 
reasoning deployed in the majority of development strategies are justified through a 
regime of economic correctness, technical justification and scientific capitalism 
(Ferguson 2006b:71) which problematizes the social realm and legitimizes the formation 
and application of “new technologies of government” (DeVries 2007:35). What is 
produced is the notion that development is “both the problem and solution” to 
underdevelopment (ibid:35).  
Considering the not so impressive resume´ of development programmes, one may 
question what is development for? What is its purpose? Is development a state of being or 
a stated objective? (Wai 2007:93) As a technique of governance, development has 
functioned and continues to function as a mechanism for, and practice of, control, 
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domination and power, which “reorder[s] space, imagine[s] and transform[s] societies, 
rewrite[s] socioeconomic and political landscapes and replace[s] one reality with 
another” (ibid:73). The discursive and technocratic practices of development construct 
people as underdeveloped “projects to be acted upon” (ibid:73). This form of 
construction is assisted by: the promotion of Westernized and Eurocentric concepts, 
approaches and models, which portrays Africans, for example, as “backward” and 
“primitive” and in need of rescue by “modern” Western practices and technologies 
(ibid:77); the conceptualization of development in “‘rational’ economistic terms” 
(ibid:79); and the language of development which stifles alternative and dissenting 
viewpoints (ibid:80). Such practices construct and manage state and society in the sense 
that they are undergoing a “managed reorganization” by international development 
policies which work through rationalities in the technical, economic, social and cultural 
realm (Mosse 2004:642).  
Acting as a technology of governance, millennial development encompasses 
and/or represents a new modality of development. It works through the implementation 
of unsupervised traits, and neoliberal characteristics and strategies, to bring about highly 
governed results and governable individuals. The “new” practices associated with the 
millennial development framework of the MDGs govern the “conduct of conduct” 
(Foucault 1982) of those individuals it acts upon in order to achieve particular objectives. 
Viewed in this light, examining the neoliberal governmentalities of the MDGs will shed 
light on the significance of the technologies and mentalities that operate within this 
global framework. 
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Millennial Development as a Neoliberal Governing Apparatus: All Aboard for 201518  
Neoliberalism has become a powerful hegemonic apparatus due to its ability to permeate 
and settle within any nation-state or policy, no matter the political, social or economic 
context. It is incredibly transformative and works in highly elusive ways. By far one of its 
most insidious aspects is its promotion and use of moral concepts of individualism, 
inclusion, and empowerment in order to not only shape and structure policies and reforms 
but to also shape the behaviours of all of those involved in the process.  
Considering the increasing prevalence and transformative power of neoliberal 
discourses, it is important to consider the “particular form” and “particular consequences” 
which follow its application and implementation (Fairclough 2003:5). Under the rubric of 
partnerships, responsibilization and benchmarking, individuals/countries fail because 
they are “not competitive enough”, due to personal or cultural reasons which do not allow 
individuals to “enhance their own human capital”, and leads to deeper and more intrusive 
neoliberal policies (Harvey 2007:34) to correct the issue. These discourses localize 
poverty through its emphasis on the state or the individual which in turn “blinds” 
populations from considering or questioning structural inequalities, or the role of the state 
in providing employment and social services (O’Reilly 2010:184). Ruckert (2007) 
maintains that poverty reduction strategy papers aim to restore political hegemony 
through novel neoliberal governing strategies and discourses of inclusive, pro-poor 
development and poverty reduction strategies and programmes, which promote and work 
                                                 
18Death, Carl. 2010. “Governing Sustainable Development: Partnerships, protests and 
power at the World Summit”.  Routledge: New York. A play on words from Alistair 
Findlay’s cartoon “all aboard for 2002” mentioned on page vii. 
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through the concepts of empowerment, participation and economic security (93). 
Cornwall and Brock (2005) state that the “essentially contested” “buzzwords” of 
participation, empowerment and poverty reduction within the MDGs are “definitionally” 
vague concepts which convey a moral authority and promote an agenda for 
transformation which in turn lend legitimacy and justification to development actors 
(1043-46). Sheppard (2010) considers the role of neoliberal discursive supplements in the 
remaking of global capitalist governance, and how they are promoted as the solution to 
underdevelopment; they generate an image of a “flattened world” whereby all countries 
are able to equally develop (185-6).  
Larner (2000) states that there are three ways in which to understand 
neoliberalism: as policy, ideology or governmentality. Viewing the practices of the 
MDGs as consisting of neoliberal governmentalities sheds light on how this global 
framework consists of neoliberal moves, rather than working within or implementing an 
all-encompassing neoliberal ideology or rigid neoliberal policy. Neoliberal practices and 
discourses represent “a system of meaning that constitutes institutions, practices and 
identities in contradictory and disjunctive ways” (ibid:12). What is so paradoxical about 
this strategy is that it promotes individualism through the problematization of the state, 
yet, it involves practices and methods of governance which aim to “encourage” 
individuals to “conform to the norms of the market” (ibid:12). This political rationality is 
“oriented to specific objectives” through governing human behaviour (Rose et.al 
2006:84). The ultimate aim is to govern “free subjects” in order to achieve “self-mastery” 
and “self-responsibility” (Ong 2007:4). Working through a “disciplinary rubric” located 
within “structures of opportunity” (Craig and Porter 2003:54), these practices and 
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methods provide and/or think of new ways to govern populations and regions that center 
on such mechanisms as decentralization, privatization, and individualization (Peck & 
Tickell 2002). The following are examples of neoliberal discourses which promote and 
represent efficiency in order to help individuals and nations to compete at a local, 
national and international level and are emphasized as remedies to underdevelopment and 
poverty (Lyon-Callo 2004:10): competition, fiscal responsibility, individual rights, 
deregulation, market-logics, lean government, privatization, “growth-chasing” economic 
development, promotion of best-practice policy, innovation and capacity building, and 
good governance (Shore 2008:284). International policies and agencies have been 
permeated by these neoliberal practices and have transformed “the poor” into subjects 
who suffer “from disorders of the self” and who can be remedied through self-
improvement activities, such as training and education, in order to “reform” their 
deficient characteristics and behaviours (ibid:18). Some of the most prevalent neoliberal 
discursive techniques that constitute this process are partnerships, responsibilization and 
benchmarking.  
Partnerships between donor countries/institutions and recipients are to provide, 
develop and establish an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and 
financial system and make available benefits of new technologies, especially information 
and communications (UNDP.org). Yet this is an elusive method of neoliberal 
governance, in that it fosters patterns of governance through its ability to create “new” 
programs by linking individuals to communities; it has the ability to mold communities 
into sites of change by encouraging individuals to become responsible for building a 
stronger community and self (Brodie 2000:123).  
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The responsibilization of the individual is another neoliberal governing 
mechanism of millennial development. It is achieved through the creation of the notion of 
freedom, in the sense that, as appreciative, free beings, individuals are required to 
conduct themselves responsibly (Rose et al 2006:91). Acting as an apparatus of rule, 
responsibilization discourse involves tools, techniques and programs in order to assist 
individuals to enhance their skills and to promote participation, communication and 
knowledge training, which should lead to social and economic change (Ilcan and Phillips 
2010). Responsibilities are bestowed upon nations and individuals through the multiple 
MDG documents produced by the UN, the programs created (as seen with “Women Feed 
the World”), and the visual and calculative devices such as graphs, tables, and timelines 
(as seen in the MDG Monitor discussed below) (ibid:856,859). This “shifting of 
responsibility” onto the local means the poor are now seen as the key “instruments” to 
reducing their own poverty; it is now their responsibility to participate in competitive 
national and global structures and programmes by selling their labour and goods in the 
context of free trade and human capital, unprotected by intermediaries, and located, 
constrained and defined by their spaces of residence (Porter & Craig 2004:415-416) in 
order to achieve the benchmarks set forth by global development organizations, policies 
and programmes.  
Benchmarking is a calculative practice, based upon global measurements and 
standards, which aims to improve one’s performance through behavior modification, 
innovation and invention (Moriarty & Smallman 2009:486). As a neoliberal aspect of the 
governing techniques of development, benchmarking promotes calculative practices 
through the language of targets, schedules, comparable data and indicators, best practices, 
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scoreboards, maps, tables, and costs, which aim to not only encourage individuals, groups 
and places to “reinvent” and “improve” themselves, but to also develop better tools to 
measure and monitor performance and progress (ibid:487, Bruno 2009:269; Shore 
2008:282). These practices legitimize the presence of development and government 
institutions, trained experts, and professional reformers, which “‘manage’ and ‘regulate’ 
the lives of ‘the poor’ in the interest of ‘normalizing’ them” (Lyon-Callo 2004:18). 
Through an analysis of these three discourses, I not only intend on exposing the 
governing strategies of each technique, but also how they complement each other, and 
work within and towards the overall global governing framework of millennial 
development. 
I have chosen to examine the MDGs as an example of millennial development 
thinking. The MDGs were implemented during the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, 
where 189 nations adopted and 147 Heads of State signed the Millennium Declaration19. 
                                                 
19 Ahmed and Cleeve (2004) provide a brief historical account of the MDGs. Within the 
past ten years, the UN, World Bank and IMF, alongside other leading development 
organizations, have introduced and established “an agreed universal framework of 
international development goals and targets” to be reached by 2015 (ibid:16). The authors 
take into account the 1995 UN Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, which 
established goals of reducing poverty fifty per cent, as well as the 2nd Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development in 1998, which incorporated these poverty reduction 
goals into its Agenda for Action, as the initial phases of the MDGs. These goals were 
further adopted in 2000 by the OECD and UN’s Copenhagen plus five Conference, and 
referred to as the UN Millennium Development Goals. Following its official recognition, 
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The UN member states committed themselves to reaching and achieving the eight, time-
bound, measureable goals, which details global aims and responds to the world's main 
development challenges, which include: to eradicate hunger and poverty; achieve 
universal primary education; promote gender equality; reduce child mortality; improve 
maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a 
global partnership (UNDP.org). This regime of practices and programmes have 
“transformed the face of global development”20 (Alston 2005:757) through the creation 
and implementation of novel ways of thinking about and pursuing development, which 
have captured the imagination of both international development agencies and national 
governments due to its limited and selective prioritization of objectives, its measurements 
to provide accountability, and its time-bound nature meant to bring precision (ibid:756). 
It aims to achieve these goals through economic growth, (ie. resource transfers, trade 
liberalization, policies, and institutions), which should enhance productivity and increase 
per capita income (Akoum 2008:229)21.  
                                                                                                                                                 
the goals were embodied in the New African Initiative at the African Leaders Lusaka 
Summit in 2001, as well as “established by a consortium of experts from the UN in 
consultations with IMF, the World Bank, and other specialized agencies of the UN 
system” (ibid:16).  
20 Stated by ex-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. 
21 There is concern however, that such a narrow focus on the economy will exclude other 
issues related to development, such as social, economic and political dimensions, since an 
economic approach only looks at small parts of the “development problem” (Akoum 
2008:229). It should be noted as of this moment, there is no direct causality between 
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The increasing importance of the MDGs can be seen within the expanding 
development literature. Vandemoortele (2009) considers “the MDG conundrum”. The 
MDGs are being misappropriated to gain support for a specific, donor-centric, 
development strategy or policy framework which is accomplished through the 
benchmarks that are difficult to meet in developing African countries, due to their “one-
size-fits-all approach”, leading to “excessive Afro-pessimism” (ibid:355). Easterly (2009) 
furthers this argument by claiming the MDGs are unfair to Africa due to its poorly made 
and arbitrary design, as well as aggressive, unrealistic and ahistoric nature of its 
benchmarking practices that are based on relative performance indicators which tend to 
make African successes look like failures (26-8). Taking more of a regional approach to 
the MDGs, Hayman (2007) examines the different perspectives of donors and recipients 
with regards to the poverty reduction efforts in Rwanda and how the discourses they 
employ “mirrors international poverty reduction agenda[s], [while] looking well beyond 
this goal” (371). This has created a struggle between the various policies and goals of 
agencies and actors, which sheds light on the irrelevance of the MDGs and its inability to 
represent regional needs (ibid:371-2). Jones and Chant further this argument in their 
examination of the effects of the MDGs on low-income, urban women and men in 
Gambia and Ghana. Education, training and employment are promoted as “remedies” to 
poverty yet these solutions impose costs on these individuals and illuminates the 
disparities between the perceived and actual role of the development strategies imposed 
                                                                                                                                                 
economic growth and the creation of new businesses, or whether entrepreneurship leads 
to economic growth (Klapper, Amit and Guillen 2010:140). 
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on the country (Jones and Chant 2009:184-5). Although these authors discuss and 
demonstrate the unfeasible and inapplicable practices of the MDGs in Africa, I find the 
existing literature to be somewhat inadequate in the sense that it leaves the reader 
wanting for more information on the examination of the MDGs as a global governing 
apparatus which not only influences the development practices and policies of nations, 
but how it molds these nations, and those residing within them, into becoming a product 
of millennial development. I believe more research needs to focus on how international 
organizations working with and through national and local actors not only frame the poor 
through the practices of the MDGs, but how they transform the conduct of those actors. 
The MDG literature tends to focus on the effective role that aid can have upon 
poverty reduction and/or development strategies (Sachs 2005, Dalgaard and Erickson 
2009, Clemens, Kenny and Moss 2007). Emphasis has been placed on the challenges 
associated with the implementation of the MDGs and how acknowledging these 
challenges can inform future goal setting (Waage et.al 2010) as well as how the MDGs 
are “unfair” to Africa (Easterly 2009) particularly focusing on the need to expand the 
concept of poverty (Sumner 2009) and human rights (Nelson 2007, Van Ginneken 2009) 
within the continent, as well as consider the various and numerous complexities on the 
ground (Jones and Chant 2009, Hayman 2007). Much emphasis has been placed on 
assessing and evaluating country performance towards reaching the MDGs (Ahmed and 
Cleeve 2004, Gaiha, Imai and Nandhi 2009, Adler, Yazhemsky and Tarverdyan 2010). 
Taking an alternative, and much needed approach, I aim to contribute to the limited but 
nonetheless valuable literature on the governmentalities of the MDGs (Tarabini 2010, 
Ilcan and Phillips 2010, Ilcan and Lacey 2011 are of note), and the discursive practices of 
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millennial development (Cornwall and Brock 2005) by analyzing the neoliberal 
governmentalities of millennial development, and how these governmentalities shape the 
policies, practices and perceptions of poverty within the context of Namibia and its 
Vision 2030 policy. I emphasized the techniques of partnerships, responsibilization and 
benchmarking, in order to display how spaces, and the individuals within these spaces, 
are molded, monitored and shaped in order to complement and fulfill millennial 
development strategies, targets and goals. These governmentalities work to govern the 
actions of the poor and ideas of poverty and poverty reduction and legitimize the 
presence of development and government institutions, trained experts, and professional 
reformers, which manage and regulate the lives of the poor. Analyzing Vision 2030 
through a governmentality lens has allowed me to demonstrate how this vision works 
within and towards larger UN frameworks which guide the relationships between 
recipients and donors. Namibians are lead into believing that development is not only in 
“their hands”, but they are also a vital ingredient in the development process. In other 
words, the ability for not only the state, but also individuals to mold themselves into self-
regulating subjects, capable of meeting the criteria of Vision 2030, is a crucial aspect for 
the transformation of the country and the achievement of Vision 2030 and the MDGs.  
The MDGs are one of the most important pacts ever made for international 
development. These goals have substantially shaped development dialogue and discourse, 
to the extent that development agencies and countries worldwide judge all of their 
activities on their contribution to, and achievement of, the MDGs. Namibia has come to 
endorse the global framework of the MDGs, and has incorporated them within their 
national poverty reduction framework, Vision 2030. This vision, launched in June 2004, 
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aims to shape the lives of the poor and reduce poverty; its stated goal is to “improve the 
quality of life of the people of Namibia to the level of their counterparts in the developed 
world by 2030” (http://www.grnnet.gov.na/aboutnam.html). It is a document that details 
Namibia’s current and future development programmes, strategies, objectives and goals 
through eight themes: inequality and social welfare; human resources development and 
institutional capacity building; macro-economic issues; population, health and 
development; Namibia’s natural resources sector; knowledge, information and 
technology; and factors of the external environment. With its main goal of poverty 
reduction, Vision 2030 is at the centre of Namibia’s national agenda (ibid). Acting as a 
“national vision” and a “perception of the future”, Vision 2030 “presents a clear view of 
where Namibia is, where it wants to go from here, and over what time frame” and will 
guide and provide direction to not only government ministries, but also to the private 
sector, NGOs, civil society and regional and local government authorities (ibid). This 
framework is “about the people”22, in that it will provide “social, economic and overall 
well-being” through the “creation of a diversified, open market economy” (ibid). 
Emphasis is placed on skills development, competitiveness, and capacity-building 
                                                 
22 The reason why the policy is seen as the “people’s policy”, or “for the people”, is due 
to the fact that many of the goals were formulated through a national opinion survey, 
regional consultations and national dialogue. Along with surveys and consultations, 
(http://www.npc.gov.na/vision/vision2030.html:38), a “Media Programme” was designed 
and implemented in order to “publicize aspects of the visioning process (through radio, 
television and print media) and encourage public participation…” 
(http://www.npc.gov.na/vision/vision2030.html:Chapter2).  
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projects, which will “transform” Namibia into a “knowledge-based society”23 with a 
“totally integrated, unified, flexible and high quality education and training system” 
(ibid). Therefore, in order to achieve the goals of Vision 2030, Namibians are encouraged 
to transform themselves, along with their actions and knowledges, in order to become a 
developed society. 
Discussions of economic growth, income inequality, and new imaginations of the 
poor and poverty appear in, and underscore, both the MDGs and Vision 2030. The 
policies are connected through multiple offices, programmes, goals, projects, policy 
documents, speeches, and reports whereby knowledge and expertise are circulated, 
transferred and applied through newsletters, web pages, working papers, manuals, and 
other publications. Vision 2030 connects directly to the MDGs and to development 
demands from international development organizations, such as the United Nations, non-
governmental organizations, government departments, and private sector firms. While it 
is believed that the success of Vision 2030 will bring about sustainable agriculture, peace, 
social justice, and gender equality (ibid) and connect to the first among the eight MDGs 
to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger” (MDG 2009), I question how and to what 
extent this national program shapes and governs poverty through the “novel” practices of 
                                                 
23 Vision 2030 focuses on the promotion of a knowledge-based economy due to the fact 
that “households who depend on…subsistence farming as the main sources of income 
have a higher incidence of poverty than the average national poverty incidence” (UNDP: 
Strategy and Policy Unit 2010: 24-6).  
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partnerships, responsibilization and benchmarking, which act as neoliberal governing 
techniques. 
Portraying the MDG framework and its practices as novel forms of development 
obscures its history and hence legitimizes its presence and its techniques. The MDGs are 
the latest link in the development goal setting chain24. They are descendents of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Development Decade of the 1960s and the 
multiple UN summits of the 20th century which focused on poverty and hunger, health, 
disease, and children (Waage et.al 2010:3). Considering the numerous years, summits 
and conventions that constitute the MDGs25, this global framework can be described as 
comprising a “global governance architecture” which is defined as an overarching system 
of institutions that comprises “organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, 
norms, regulations, and decision-making procedures” (Biermann et al 2009:15) as well as 
“policy-makers, practitioners and experts…civil society actors… [and] virtually every 
major international development agency” which produces multiple reports about the 
progress made towards development initiatives (Alston 2005:756-7). Therefore labeling 
the MDGs as a new strategy or understanding of development is largely rhetorical; it 
veils the actual occurrences within, and effects of, development policies and programs. 
                                                 
24 Development programmes prior to the implementation of the MDGs focused on market 
reforms and economic stabilization as prerequisites to development. This highly flawed, 
controversial and stagnant outlook led to the formation of a millennial development 
framework and its promotion of softer forms of development focusing on partnerships, 
pro-poor policies, and inclusion (Cleeve and Ndhlovu 2004:9).  
25 See footnote 19. 
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The institutions and actors that comprise the MDGs work through a framework which 
entails dissatisfaction, questioning and a demand to govern better. It is because of the 
failure of previous development polices and programmes that the millennial development 
practices of the MDGs have been promoted and legitimized as a novel form of 
development allowing for the governing of subjects in developing countries. Actively 
supporting and implementing millennial development policies and programmes not only 
localizes the issue of poverty, but it aims to shape the lives of the poor within these 
underdeveloped regions through particular discursive practices in order to create self-
disciplined and responsible individuals who are capable of taking themselves out of their 
own poverty. Larger structural issues are diminished, forms of assistance and social 
services are downsized, and benchmarks are epitomized. 
Celebrating the virtues of self-management, self-responsibility, individuation, and 
calculation (Swyngedouw 2005:1998,2003) portrays the MDGs as empowering for the 
socially, culturally, economically and politically marginalized, but they are “an integral 
part of the consolidation of an imposed and authoritarian neo-liberalism” (ibid:1998). 
According to the UNDP, in order to achieve the MDGs, the goals must be implemented 
at the national and local level and must work to produce clearly defined timelines and 
requirements (http://www.undp.org/poverty/topics1_mdg_based_national_ 
planning.shtml). The strategies must also be based on, and surround the needs of, poor 
individuals, communities and countries, meaning the MDGs must be implemented 
nationally, and work within all sectors in order to achieve medium and/or long-term 
results (ibid).  
42 
 
To facilitate those nation-states working within the MDG framework, the 
UN/UNDP adheres to four steps: launching inclusive planning processes; taking 
inventory; conducting detailed assessments to estimate what is required to achieve the 
MDGs; and finally developing national strategies that draw upon MDG needs 
assessments (ibid). The ultimate aim is to “develop the capacity of local actors” in order 
to assist with, and achieve, target and goal planning and setting, as well as to strengthen 
local institutions to ensure the achievement of the goals and to establish links between 
national policies and local practices (ibid). The individuals within these spaces must 
maintain ownership over the development process and must participate or be involved in 
actions to achieve the goals (http://www.undp.org/poverty/topics5_xc_mdg_ 
localization.shtml). Localizing the MDGs will “draw attention to pockets of poverty” and 
identify underdeveloped areas in order to improve services (ibid). If further assistance is 
needed, the UN will provide “training programmes” on MDG-based development 
strategies (http://www.undp.org/poverty/topics1_mdg_based_national_planning.shtml). 
These actions demonstrate how structural issues are diminished, and local “deficiencies” 
are highlighted in the development process. If communities or nations are unable to reach 
the goals, or create a decent timeline, than corrective measures will be employed in order 
to assist with these transformative practices. By nationalizing and localizing development 
the poor will now not only “identify local issues” which inhibit development, but they 
will also contribute to and be involved in new categories and prescriptions (Craig and 
Porter 2006:80). In this sense, the poor are involved in creating and governing themselves 
and the actions needed in order to reach the development goals.  
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It is therefore important to question what kinds of ‘subjectivities’ or ‘selves’ are 
required within millennial development programmes. It appears that individuals are 
required to be “‘flexible’, active, ‘self-managed’ and ‘self-disciplined’” which will allow 
the individual to be productive, cost-effective and able to “‘govern themselves’ through 
the exercise of introspection, calculation and judgment” (Shore 2008:283-4). The perfect 
subject will therefore be one who is focused and dedicated to the national objective 
through voluntary initiatives, and who will “make the most of their own existence by 
conducting their life responsibly” (Rose 1996:45). The discursive practices surrounding 
poverty reduction not only shape individuals but also reshape alternative approaches to 
and voices of development, allowing for the dominance of a development model 
consisting of neoliberal development governmentalities (Kothari 2005b:429). What has 
been created are not methods and modes of development and/or poverty reduction, but a 
“‘new’ global agenda for development” (Tarabini 2010:205), a “one size fits all” (Craig 
and Porter 2006:87) approach that favours particular neoliberal techniques and remedies. 
Such an agenda can, for example, be seen in both Kenya’s and Botswana’s development 
plans and poverty reduction strategies.  
Kenya prepared a National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP), which spans from 
1999 to 2015, and gives prominence to poverty reduction. This plan views poverty and 
development as a political necessity, moral obligation, and economic requirement. 
Guided by the MDGs, the plan’s major components focus on social integration, economic 
growth, and setting out a framework which will detail the actions of government, civil 
society, the private sector and donor partners (Oyugi 2008:11) who will be responsible 
for the implementation of the policy. In order to accomplish this national development 
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plan, Kenya formulated and implemented its Vision 2030 policy “which aims at making 
Kenya a ‘newly industrialized middle income country providing a high quality life for all 
its citizens by the year 2030” (ibid:12). Botswana is also working through a similar 
framework due to its endorsement of the MDGs. Botswana’s main development goals 
focus on poverty alleviation, increasing employment and social integration. These goals 
have been nationalized and articulated within Botswana’s National Development Plan, 
Vision 2016. The major components of this plan include: economic growth and 
diversification, employment, and entrepreneurship development (ibid:12). Comparing 
Kenya’s and Botswana’s approaches to development and poverty reduction, verifies the 
“one size fits all” argument in that although each country has their own unique 
identification, each are working within a similar development framework: pursuing 
economic growth, incorporating and strengthening institutions of governance, focusing 
on infrastructural development, and investing in human capital, or capacity-building 
(ibid:12). 
The all-encompassing and pervasive practices of neoliberal discursive techniques 
have therefore become engrained in millennial development thinking and have now 
become a commonsense interpretation of the world which have had serious consequences 
upon ways of thought and practice (Harvey 2007:23) and have created serious 
inequalities and disintegration in the form of “politico-social exclusion…exacerbated 
poverty, social disparities, economic degradation, violence and social disintegration” (De 
La Barra 2006:126)26. Rather than seeing the failure of development as the effect of a 
                                                 
26 These inequalities are due to: the lack of democracy; levels of violence, both personal 
and institutional; the unlimited drive for profits and power; the lack of respect for the 
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particular practice or framework, blame is instead placed upon the individual, or the 
local, due to the neoliberal advancement of entrepreneurial freedoms, individual liberty, 
and free trade (ibid:126).  
Neoliberal techniques and discourses of development view social inequality as a 
result of individual differences, inabilities, or incapacities and works to not only identify 
and produce boundaries of poverty and underdevelopment, but they also transform these 
“problem” spaces into spaces of opportunity and places of possibility; these spaces are 
now “sites of development, not proof of development’s failure” (Ferguson 2007:75). The 
following chapter will examine how the neoliberal techniques of partnerships, 
responsibilization and benchmarking, have transformed people and places into sites of 
possibility by examining how they work individually and collectively as governing 
techniques, at both a national and international level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
state of law at international, national and local levels; unfair markets and the 
manipulation of foreign exchange rates (De La Barra 2006:134-35). 
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Chapter 3 
The “Three Faces”27 of Millennial Development: Partnerships, Responsibilization  
and Benchmarking within the MDGs 
 
Neoliberal discourses have had a very powerful effect upon our current understanding of 
underdevelopment and poverty. The poor are now portrayed as deprived of capacity, 
which justifies their incorporation into the development process and the application of 
global development frameworks. These frameworks, and the organizations that endorse 
them, whole-heartedly believe that in order reduce or alleviate the effects of poverty, the 
focus must be placed on partnerships, responsibilization and benchmarking. Described as 
methods which will “empower” and “involve” the poor within and throughout the 
development process (UNDP 2010), these practices involve neoliberal techniques of 
governance.  
 
Partnerships of the MDGs 
“…where there is partnership, there are gains”
28 
Partnerships aim to bring together the multiple and various development partners into a 
single framework in order to ensure direction, correspondence and complicity. Located 
within the framework of millennial development, partnerships join local development 
                                                 
27 Comaroff and Comaroff. 2000. Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second 
Coming. Public Culture v12(2), pp.291-343. This quote is a play on words from their 
subtitle “Three Faces of Millennial Capitalism” on page 309. 
28 Remarks delivered by the Secretary-General at the High-level Event on the Millennium 
Development Goals, New York, 25 September 2008. Located on page 58 of the United 
Nations’ “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2009” (MDG 2009).  
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issues to global programs. The MDGs emphasize partnerships between developed and 
developing countries in order to create a local, national and international environment 
which is “conducive to development and the elimination of poverty’” (MDG 2009:80). 
The concept has gained so much importance, that one of the goals of the MDGs focuses 
specifically on it: to develop a global partnership for development through addressing the 
special needs of LDCs (least developed countries) (http://www.undp.org/mdg/ 
basics.shtml). The UN emphasizes the fact that they are voluntary agreements and multi-
stakeholder initiatives which aim to implement inter-governmentally agreed upon 
sustainable development goals (Mert 2009:111).  
It is difficult to deny partnership strategies, particularly due to the bombardment 
of videos, case studies, maps, charts and latest feeds, portraying and/or discussing the 
opinions of civil society, advocates and envoys, as well as success stories, emphasizing 
the need to implement partnership policies globally. The UNDP site has a variety of 
colourful and quite attractive links that visually display the positive effects of 
partnerships. Their “Picture This: We Can End Poverty” photo contest provides a 
winning photo which best represents partnerships: entitled as “New Horizons”, a picture 
displays Camila Gonzalez “studying at home on a computer she received through 
Uruguay’s ‘One Laptop per Child’ programme” (http://www.undp.org/picturethis2010/ 
mdg8.shtml). The site also offers a variety of national success stories. For example, the 
country of Benin is “on track to ensure primary education for all by 2015…” due to the 
policies that were created and implemented through the partnership between the UNDP 
and the Government of Benin. The site displays a picture of a young boy, smiling, 
holding a chalkboard that says “j’aime mon ecole”, allowing the onlooker to visually see 
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the positive effects of these partnerships, in the form of school supplies, assistance, and 
access to cleaner drinking water (http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2010/september/ 
benin-on-track-to-achieve-universal-primary-education.en). Malawi is currently “on the 
road to fighting poverty”; one village in particular used to be a “hunger prone area” with 
low yields, unaffordable fertilizer and seeds, and have malnourished children with no 
access to clean water. However, “a lot has changed” since the introduction of the 
Millennium Villages Project, which is a partnership between the UNDP, the Earth 
Institute at Columbia University and the Millennium Promise29. The project has 
intervened in rural areas in order to “alleviate poverty and provide access to education 
and other basic necessities” (http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2010/september/ 
malawi-on-the-road-to-fighting-poverty.en). Households have been given seeds and 
fertilizer, and have been taught improved farming techniques, allowing farmers to 
produce a surplus of crops, and to provide villagers with food security and income (ibid). 
Providing detailed and intimate photographs and stories works to create or unite feelings 
of compassion and approval (Sontag 2003:18). The pictures aim to demonstrate the 
validity of partnerships. 
There are also numerous MDG YouTube video links on the UN websites, where 
anyone has the option of watching videos ranging from gender equality and female 
empowerment, to starving children, or dying HIV/AIDS patients. Although most of the 
                                                 
29 The Millennium Promise is the leading international non-profit organization committed 
to supporting the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals to halve extreme 
poverty by 2015. The Millennium Promise oversees the Millennium Villages project 
(http://www.millenniumpromise.org/our_mission.php). 
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videos tend to incorporate the power of partnerships, there are many that are strictly 
dedicated to the topic. One video entitled “UN Millennium Campaign Goal 8 Global 
Partnership” narrates that “we have the money and the means, what we want is action” 
and that without action on global partnerships, “poor countries will not achieve the first 
seven goals: ending poverty and hunger; providing education for all and stopping deadly 
diseases like AIDS” (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EXDDNFLDiFw). Various 
images are shown, more than likely located within developing countries, of people doing 
daily tasks in what seems to be strenuous, depleted and dirty environments. Information 
is provided about the degree of poverty associated with farmers/ing in developing 
countries, with slow, sad music playing in the background. Dead fields and crops are 
shown in Africa, associated with statistics on the amount of children and adults who die 
from starvation. When all hope seems lost, upbeat and cheerful music plays along with 
Ugandan school children singing in school uniforms, where 2 million extra children now 
attend school, due to the better health care centers and systems in the region, as well as 
the flowing water and drugs which are provided through partnerships (ibid). Portraying 
partnerships between international, national and local actors and institutions as the most 
important element in the development project and as “one of the most important deals in 
history” makes it difficult for anyone to disagree with the practice (ibid).  
The partnerships of the MDGs are portrayed as necessary to fulfill the needs and 
desires of the two billion victims of poverty. The UNDP states that “it is up to us” to 
assist with the needs of these individuals (http://www.undp.org/poverty/focus_mdg_ 
strategies.shtml). Although it unclear as to who represents “us”, the UNDP has clearly 
chosen to fulfill that role in their declaration to: 
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Provide leadership and…coordination to develop capacity in countries to assess 
what is needed to achieve the MDGs, to conceptualize policies and to design 
strategies and plans. For this purpose, UNDP organizes consultations and training, 
conducts research, develops planning and information management tools… 
provide[s] hands-on support to countries to scale up implementation of initiatives 
to achieve the MDGs… [and] assist[s] countries to report on their progress 
(ibid). 
It is through the mechanisms of partnerships that governing bodies are able to join local 
representations of poverty to the administrative mechanisms of global development 
initiatives and to improve development practices (Craig & Porter 2005:240). This process 
is legitimized through the creation and granting of freedom, whereby developing African 
states “are expected to exercise their agency responsibly and in ways consistent with 
international norms and values” (Abrahamsen 2004:1462). Through inclusion, states are 
molded into becoming compliant, self-governed and accountable members of the global 
community.  
Acting as a method of advanced neoliberal rule partnerships are “voluntary and 
coercive at the same time” which generates “new forms of agency and new forms of 
discipline” that provide the disguise for the dominance of Western states and 
international governing agencies (ibid:1454).  Poor countries are to now be active in 
achieving the MDGs:  “They must do their part to ensure greater accountability to 
citizens and efficient use of resources. But for poor countries to achieve the…goals, it is 
absolutely critical that rich countries deliver on their end of the bargain with more and 
more effective aid, more sustainable debt relief and fairer trade rules, well in advance of 
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2015” (http://www.endpoverty2015.org/en/goals/global-partnership). Partnership 
techniques not only localizes blame, in the sense it is the duty of the country to properly 
implement the MDGs, but it also enables larger and more powerful development partners 
to subtly structure and shape the outcome of the program and the participants themselves 
due to their “absolutely critical” role. Voluntarily entering into and engaging with 
partnership structures molds and shapes the conduct of millennial development 
participants. Of course one can always debate about just how voluntary these partnerships 
are. It is possible that countries enter into partnerships due to the possible repercussions 
they may face by the international community. What makes partnerships an elusive 
development governmentality is its ability to work not through direct domination or 
imposition, but rather, through its ability to simultaneously exclude and incorporate, in 
order to create and produce the perfect neoliberal state. 
The current rhetorical practice of partnerships merely conceals the power of 
international agencies. According to Mosse, “power lies in the narratives that maintain an 
organization’s definition of the problem…” (2004:646). Placed in the context of 
millennial development, it is important to consider how the UN/UNDP defines the 
problem of poverty and underdevelopment. The organizations claim that in order to 
pursue development, a country must “create productive and gainful employment” as well 
as “effective and efficient social safety nets to protect those who cannot work or who 
earn too little” (http://www.undp.org/poverty/focus_inclusive_development.shtml). The 
key however, to achieving the MDGs, is through “enhanc[ing] public services by 
building schools and hospitals, training teachers and doctors, and providing access to 
water, sanitation and transportation, all of which requires…[w]ell-designed fiscal 
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policies…” (ibid). By detailing the needs of underdeveloped countries, the UNDP 
solidifies its presence as a major development partner, and hence shapes and influences 
the development process within the region. 
Partnerships in the African context emerged as a “new framework” whereby, 
rather than being seen as a neo-colonial practice of intervention, it was instead a mode of 
“returning power” to the region (Abrahamsen 2004:1455). For example, the MDG 
Achievement Fund (MDG-F) emphasizes the egalitarian and harmonious nature of the 
relationships between partners, who range from farmers up to governmental 
organizations. According to the MDG-F, programmes are developed in consultation with 
government and civil society in order to generate national ownership policy frameworks 
(http://www.mdgfund.org/page/ourprogrammes). A pie chart is also provided which 
displays the percentage, and perhaps influence, that each partner has in the process. Even 
with the promotion of democracy, inclusion, ownership and egalitarianism, there 
continues to be tension surrounding partnerships, for it believed that partnerships are 
simply a veil for the continued implementation of structural adjustment programs by 
international development and financial institutions (Mercer 2003:745). Although the 
partnerships of the MDGs describe developing countries as no longer “recipients”, but 
“agents of their own development”, they continue to be monitored by larger governing 
bodies, donors, institutions, etc. (ibid:746). As referenced above, it is important to note 
that although civil society, and local and national governments appear to represent about 
seventy percent of the graph, what needs to be considered is the power that the remaining 
actors have over the process, such as academic institutions, international governmental 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and international financial institutions.  
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In order to properly implement a development policy, countries must work with 
and through MDG-based planning and policy implementation and its multiple and 
various international and national partners since they provide guidance and standards. 
Therefore, in order for regions to develop, certain policies should be nationally owned 
and implemented to not only partake in their own development, but to also coordinate 
with globally assigned goals and standards. Namibia’s Vision 2030 is but one of many 
nationally owned yet globally framed development initiatives made in the image of the 
MDGs. This development plan serves as “the country’s road map” to development 
standards and has been “fully and systematically integrated” within the Millennium 
Development Goals (NPC 2008:iv). Some of the other Sub-Saharan African countries 
which have mainstreamed the MDGs into their national frameworks are Mauritius 
(Vision 2020), Nigeria (Vision 2020), Tanzania (Vision 2025), Zanzibar (Vision 2020) 
and Zambia (Vision 2030) (http://www.undp.org/mdg/countries.shtml). The partnerships 
endorsed by and located within the MDGs are a method of “governing at a distance”, in 
that the promotion of country-led and locally owned development strategies generates the 
illusion of “being in the driver’s seat”, yet populations and states remain under the 
guidance of the IMF, World Bank and UN (Rojas 2004:107).  
As a rationality of millennial development, partnerships are in fact an illusion of 
“contract governance” whereby previously “unequal” relationships are “re-aligned” as 
partnerships (Phillips & Ilcan 2004:398). This act makes partnerships one of the “major 
distraction gimmick[s]” (Bond 2006:341) of the MDGs, in that they enforce social 
transformation and enable development organizations to “govern at a distance” by 
making it possible to structure and shape the subject without coercion, control or 
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conditionality (Mercer 2003:746). What is so influential and powerful about the discourse 
of partnerships, is that it shapes and molds countries into becoming active and 
responsible agents who will participate with development organizations, governing 
bodies, or other states/countries, in order to eradicate their own poverty. Partnerships 
therefore invoke specific technologies which aim to “produce modern, self-disciplined 
citizens and states that can be trusted to govern themselves according to liberal 
democratic norms” (Abrahamsen 2004:1454). Acting as a neoliberal rationality, 
partnerships can be seen as a method to maintain the governing practices of development 
agencies, as well as produce self-disciplined, neoliberal states and citizens, who are 
responsible for their own development.  
 
Responsibilization and the MDGs 
“…we encourage people to take responsibility for their development and promote 
development activities that address the actual needs of the people…”
30  
 
Due to the failures of previous development projects, which lacked a focus on “pro-poor” 
involvement, millennial development policies have begun reaching out to and including 
the poor, in order to make proper and representative decisions, and implement relevant 
and appropriate mechanisms (Nekwaya 2007:10). So in this sense, millennial 
development is now defined by the active involvement of not only nations (through 
partnerships strategies), but also the involvement, and hence responsibilization of 
individuals living within those underdeveloped regions. Responsibilization is meant to 
allow the poor to not only “determine their own destination”, but to also empower them 
                                                 
30 Government of Namibia: About Namibia. Chapter 2 – Namibia an Overview, pp.34.  
<http://www.grnnet.gov.na/aboutnam.html>. 
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through the development of their “skills and abilities” (ibid:ii). Making individuals 
responsible for development is not only a foundation of the MDGs, but it is also an 
essential element to its achievement. It is believed that “local actors—community leaders, 
local government officials, civil society activists, farmers and entrepreneurs—know best 
what does and does not work within their communities and they should have the voice 
and support they need to work their way towards a better quality of life” 
(http://www.undp.org/poverty/focus_local_development.shtml). This idea is 
demonstrated in Kenya’s new tracking mechanism. This quite novel initiative allows 
Kenyans to anonymously report on the success and/or failure of development projects via 
text messaging. The project will “enable and empower citizens to voice their concerns 
quickly, efficiently and cheaply...” (http://www.endpoverty2015.org/en/africa/news/5-
months-after-mdg-summit-citizen-tracking-mechanism-launched-kenya/16/feb/11). It is 
questionable how those without access to such technologies, being those who live in 
poverty and in the greatest need of the services, will be able to voice their opinions and 
needs. Unfortunately, making citizens responsible for the development process may not 
only stifle the opinions of those who lack the ability to participate, but it may legitimize 
further cutbacks and restructuring policies due to inabilities to object at the local level.  
Responsibilization techniques work through agency, in that it engages with the 
individual as active, free, informed and responsible subjects who are capable of taking 
control of development initiatives, as well as their own lives (Abrahamsen 2004:1460). 
Making the poor responsible for the achievement of development policies is a 
technocratic governing mechanism of development, whereby spaces are defined and 
accorded with particular characteristics which work to locate and authenticate 
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deficiencies within the space. This practice creates subjects of development, who are 
molded and shaped to fit within larger government and development blueprints. 
Revealing “deficiencies” legitimizes development practices and programmes. Placed 
within the context of millennial development, responsibilization offers and formulates 
new ways of thinking about reducing poverty by making individuals responsible for the 
achievement of the multiple and various development goals. This technique localizes 
underdevelopment and poverty through apolitical terms and practices, and “spin and 
deceit” concepts (Craig and Porter 2003:54), whereby the poor are incorporated into an 
inclusive framework which avoids any discussion or acknowledgement of inequality or 
political economy (ibid:54). Through practices of responsibilization, the poor have not 
only been incorporated into larger universalizing models and blueprints of poverty 
reduction, but they also embody them. Viewing the poor as responsible representatives of 
millennial development localizes and responsibilizes the issue of poverty and keeps key 
crucial issues, for example, property and power distributions, along with other 
systemic/structural influences, off of the larger global political and development agenda 
(Craig & Porter 2005:228).  
To become a responsible member of development projects and programmes, 
individuals are encouraged to develop their entrepreneurial skills, in the sense that they 
are encouraged to be innovative, have organizational capacities, as well as create and 
maintain connections to local communities, in order to deliver responsible and effective 
services in a cost-efficient way (Ilcan 2006:864, de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff 
2010:66). Individuals should/will receive “relevant training” as well as the “necessary 
education” needed in order to fulfill their capacities as well as meet the requirements of 
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today’s economy. According to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, education is key 
to achieving the MDGs, particularly the goals surrounding poverty because it affects 
individual income and economic growth, leading to economic and social progress. 
Educating individuals, particularly marginalized individuals, such as women and girls, 
those who live in rural areas, the poor, and minorities, is “one of the best investments that 
any country can make…” because “they can earn more income, [and] improve their 
family’s well being…” (http://www.endpoverty2015.org/en/universal-education/ 
news/education-vital-achieving-other-anti-poverty-targets-ban-stresses/25/sep/08). The 
universal need to educate and transform the poor into employable and responsible 
citizens is then instilled in national mindsets and policies. For example, Namibia is 
currently “Planning for a Learning Nation” by implementing mechanisms needed to 
transform the country into a knowledge-based society in schools, colleges and vocational 
training centers in order to attain the national development goals (ETSIP 2007:v, 2). 
Attending “high quality” senior secondary education centers, “market responsive” 
vocational education and training centers, and pre-entry programmes for tertiary 
education (ibid:3) will improve “the quality, range and threshold of skilled labour” 
(ibid:2) and hence expand opportunities for the poor. Vision 2030 states these 
components will guarantee an “immediate injection of skilled labour of various levels and 
types” into its economic structure (ibid:3) as well as “ensur[e] an enduring supply of 
candidates that will take up opportunities for [further] education and training…and 
lifelong learning” (ibid:3). Through the continual acquisition of skills and knowledge, 
individuals will be transformed into citizens responsible to themselves, to the state, and to 
the successful implementation of development goals. 
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The individual is lead to believe that they are involved with the formation and 
implementation of the policies necessary to develop their particular region/community. 
Responsibilization techniques work under the guise that it addresses or responds to the 
needs and desires of local communities, however, these projects are devised by 
international development agencies, who are “backed by its rule books, monitors and 
auditing devices, and [are] designed to shape desires and act on actions, setting the 
conditions so that people would behave as they ought” (Li 2007:231, italics in original). 
Responsibilization practices of the MDGs therefore represent a “subjectification” of 
individuals in the developing countries of Africa. Although discussed as “capable, 
rational, and responsible agents”, individuals are molded and subjected to technocratic, 
governing practices, in order to accomplish the standards set by the MDGs, which places 
them under increased scrutiny (Jaeger 2010:76-77). Responsibilization acts as a 
technology of governance by making groups and populations become self-regulating and 
responsible, allowing them to achieve the benchmarks of the MDGs as well as be 
subjected to the monitoring practices of international development organizations, 
financial institutions and partners.  
 
Benchmarking the MDGs 
“Progress is being made, but not fast enough to reach the MDG target[s]”
31 
Benchmarking the MDGs has created pressure and competition among, between and 
within developing countries due to its emphasis and ability to implement standards, 
                                                 
31 United Nations. 2010. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010. pp. 1-76. 
This quote is located on page 13. 
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deviations, and “notions of efficiency” (Miller 2008:59). This process works to transform 
its objects into beings that can be measured and compared. The aim is to reveal and to fix 
existing inconsistencies and predicaments. In this sense, benchmarking is a practice, and 
a technology, whereby the object, or the individual is “brought into existence” (Kalthoff 
2005:73) and then reorganized and shaped in order to complement global development 
frameworks. The calculative practices associated with this technique have generated 
particular knowledges about developing countries, naturalized the process of 
development and emphasized and revered the best performer. 
It is through this calculative practice, based upon global measurements and 
standards, that global and national development programmes govern and shape the social 
and economic lives of the poor. Targets, best practices, schedules, comparable data and 
indicators, scoreboards, maps, tables, and costs, are promoted which aim to not only 
encourage individuals, groups and places to “reinvent” and “improve” themselves, but to 
also develop better tools to measure and monitor performance and progress (Moriarty & 
Smallman 2009:487, Bruno 2009:269; Shore 2008:282). Placed within the context  of the 
MDGs, these practices can complement global and/or national frameworks, due to the 
emphasis placed on country-led development strategies, private-sector led growth, 
capacity training and cost-effective investments in human development (Hayman 
2007:380).  
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Benchmarks are by far the most notable technique located within the MDGs. 
Progress towards the MDGs are measured through 21 targets and 60 official indicators32, 
which allows the UN, and its many governing bodies, to acknowledge “how far the world 
has come in meeting the goals” (MDG 2010:76). The goal to “eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger” is measured by three targets: Target 1a) “halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day”; Target 1b) “Achieve, full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people; 
Target 1c) “Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from 
hunger” (MDG 2010). Country data are aggregated at the subregional and regional level, 
yet the situation of individual countries varies significantly (ibid). For example, while it 
appears that the majority of Asian countries are on track to meeting Target 1a33, the 
majority of the countries in Africa (with data) are not (http://www.mdgmonitor.org/map. 
cfm?goal=&indicator=&cd=). Difficulty implementing or achieving the MDGs may 
possibly indicate difficulty with target application, the increasing level of ownership by 
international institutions, the complexity of the targets and indicators, or it may be the 
issue that the targets are incomplete or imprecise in relation to the goals (Waage et al. 
2010:7). Even with such issues, there continues to be pressure to incorporate the goals 
                                                 
32 It is stated that the MDGs were “linked with indicators, for the purposes of 
measurement, and with goals, for the purpose of conceptual simplicity” (Waage et.al 
2010:3). 
33 With the exception of India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Laos (MDGMonitor). 
61 
 
into national frameworks34, as seen in the 60 national MDG reports provided on the 
UNDP website, with countries ranging from Bahrain, to Chile, to the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (http://www.undp.org/mdg/countries.shtml). Whether or not the 
goals were intended to be nationally owned and/or implemented, countries continue to 
work with and through them in order to demonstrate their compliance with this global 
governing framework.  
The quantitative time-bound framework of the MDGs deciphers whether a 
country is “moving forward” towards the achievement of the poverty reduction targets of 
2015 or “lagging behind” with “unmet commitments” and “shortfalls” (MDG 2010:6). 
Those who are “making slow progress” toward specific targets, will be noted by the 
MDG Acceleration Framework (MAF) which will then further implement four 
“systematic” steps in order to identify “necessary interventions” to achieve the target, 
locate any possible bottlenecks, identify “high-impact and feasible solutions”, and 
formulate an “action plan” that will set specific roles for all of those involved in the 
process (UNDP 2010:7). The power of the MDG benchmark lies in its ability to label, 
describe and manipulate the progress of countries through “result-based” targeting; by 
focusing on the proportions of people above the $1 per day poverty line, or the 
                                                 
34 Waage et al (2010) state that due to “the importance that donors put on the MDGs, 
governments might feel pressure to show progress against their specific targets, whatever 
their national priorities might be. The MDGs are frequently mentioned by ministries in 
the poorest countries, and are often referred to in poverty reduction strategy papers. 
Fukuda-Parr’s analysis of 22 such papers has shown how almost all of them mentioned 
the MDGs…” (Waage et al 2010:13). 
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percentage of people who are employed, contextually specific targets are dismissed 
(Waage et al. 2010:11). Using these decontextualized results or benchmarks to indicate 
“progress” or development at a national level complements the argument that the goals 
were “never intended as national targets” due to the fact that they do not take into account 
local context, technical feasibility or financial affordability (ibid:14). Because the goals 
have little relevance or applicability on the ground, countries will tend to have a higher 
rate of failure. The application of these benchmarks to developing African countries has 
generated a sense of “defeatism” and “Afropessimism”35 (ibid:14, Vandemoortele 
2009:355), as well as an increasing prioritization and problematization of poverty in the 
region.   
The MDGs are unfair to the region in that they are poorly designed to measure the 
progress occurring within a country, let alone a continent36. It is estimated that Sub-
Saharan Africa will need to maintain 7% annual growth in GDP (Easterly 2009:26-9), yet 
in 2010, it was a respectable 4¾ per cent, and in 2011, it is predicted to reach 5¾ per cent 
(IMF 2010:3). According to the unrealistic goals of the MDGs, it is not enough, leading 
to a stigmatization of the continent (Easterly 2009:26-9). According to an MDG report 
assessing the progress in Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa “continues to considerably lag 
                                                 
35 One of the key issues with the MDGs is how it discriminates against Africa. The 
acontextual and unachievable nature of the goals has meant that 42 out of 47 African 
countries “are considered ‘off track’ for at least half of the targets and 12 are ‘off-track’ 
for all targets” (Clemens, Kenny and Moss 2007:736). 
36 “Progress” or “failure” depends on the way that targets are measured (Easterly 
2009:26-9). 
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behind all other regions of the world” (MDG 2009:12). Having goals for Africa without 
historical precedent generates the image of “Africa as failure” and legitimizes the image 
of “Western as savior” (Easterly 2009:34). African failure generates “fields of visibility” 
and allows for the establishment of best practices, goals, possibilities, outcomes, 
comparison and emulation, which normalizes the monitoring of national results (Bruno 
2009:274) in order to transform and accelerate the pace of development (MDG 2010:7). 
With an emphasis on “failure”, the neoliberal rationalities of the MDGs are justifiably 
implemented within national policies.  
Emphasizing best practices localizes poverty, in the sense that national or 
individual conduct is judged and shaped by the larger structural indicators of global 
governing institutions in order to eradicate “their” poverty (Bruno 2009:273-4; Shore 
2008:281). This structure of power has created and continues to create visibility, patterns, 
and economic and social modes of management (Miller 2008:54) allowing poverty and 
spaces of underdevelopment to become “visible, calculable and operable” (ibid:52). The 
targets are used as “yardsticks” or “bonds” against which individuals and states judge, 
order, rank and measure their performance and competitiveness. Those who are unable or 
unwilling to follow this path are in turn pressured or stigmatized through “naming”, 
“framing”, and “shaming” techniques (Bruno 2009:273-4; Shore 2008:281-2). The MDG 
Monitor evaluates the progress of developing countries towards reaching the MDGs 
through a colour coded map. This website is accessible to any and all individuals who 
wish to “track” and “learn” about any of the 130 countries listed on the website. The map 
vividly displays the power of “naming”, “framing” and “shaming”. With just a click of a 
mouse, anyone is able to judge, rank, measure and compare the progress of a country 
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through the varying shades of red on the global MDG map (http://www.mdgmonitor.org/ 
map.cfm? goal=&indicator=&cd=). Countries are then shamed by the international 
community, and led to provide explanations for their poverty and solutions. For example, 
Zanzibar is off track to meet the MDGs due to high population growth rates, leading the 
government of the country to focus on implementing stricter migration policies and 
family planning campaigns (http://www.unpo.org/article/6948). Some other causes 
include human capabilities, governance, disease and education. The country aims to 
achieve the MDGs and mend its deficiencies through its Vision 2020 policy, which 
provides “strategies to mobilise and utilise domestic financial resources, both public and 
private, and a framework for attracting external resources to support prioritised 
expenditure plans” (http://www.unpei.org/PDF/TZ-zanzibar-strategy-growth-poverty-
reduction.pdf: 2). The policy focuses on “reducing income poverty, improving human 
capabilities, survival and social well-being and containing extreme vulnerability… 
education, health, agriculture, tourism, infrastructure…and water, as well as cross-cutting 
issues like good governance, trade and combating HIV and AIDS” (ibid). The goal is to 
display the nation’s willingness and ability to alter and transform itself into a country 
capable of the achieving the MDGs. Displayed at such a visual and quite vivid level, 
benchmarks have the ability to generate competitive aspirations through comparative 
evaluation, but competition and competitiveness are ideas and “‘ideas do not float 
freely’” (Bruno 2009:262); they are influenced and/or produced by neoliberal rationalities 
and governing techniques.  
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Benchmarking acts as an “‘indefinite discipline’ of competitiveness”37, which 
generates new knowledges, experts38, technologies and programmes due to the fact that 
the benchmark is a moving and unattainable target which cannot be reached, set only to 
be replaced by the latest best performer (ibid:277). They are unattainable due to its ability 
to make “organizationally discrete and spatially disparate objects” comparable; the ability 
to make the “incommensurable commensurable” allows spaces of poverty to be 
represented as global, and reparable only through numbers, competition, best practice 
policies, and emulation (Larner and Le Heron 2004:212-215). Making the 
incommensurable commensurable means benchmarks ignore crucial differences and 
diminishes contextual complexities. These standards are able to connect billions of 
people worldwide, along with regions and countries, and compare community practices 
with others who share little in common, and places them within a global development 
framework. The use and application of standards and deviations not only naturalizes and 
universalizes the practices of benchmarks, due to the objectivity and factuality associated 
                                                 
37 Bruno borrows this term from Foucault who defines it as “a procedure that would be at 
the same time the permanent measure of a gap in relation to an inaccessible norm and the 
asymptotic movement that strives to meet in infinity” (Bruno 2009:277). 
38 The rise of benchmarking and calculation has generated a “reserve army of marginal 
and casually employed professionals…a regime of bureaucrats, inspectors, 
commissioners, regulators and experts which…is eroding professional autonomy and 
threatening…democratic freedoms” (Shore 2008:282-83). 
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with numbers, but it also transforms individuals who can now be calculated and 
measured, repaired and resolved.  
As a governing practice of millennial development, benchmarking infuses new 
modes of conduct into developing countries leading to the reorganization of forms of 
behaviour. Individuals are assessed by, and regulate their own performance through, the 
concepts of efficiency, economy and cost-effectiveness. This process may be referred to 
as “regulated self-regulation” (Shore 2008:281). These practices naturalize and legitimize 
not only the grading, and the hierarchical placement of countries or continents, but also 
the identification and implementation of corresponding recommendations. The power of 
a single number can shape and create, define, alter and influence social relations, the way 
individuals live their lives, and the way they understand the world (Miller 2008:57-8). 
The benchmark makes development a technology of governance due to the fact that it 
provides a framework in which spaces are made visible and hence open to judgments and 
policies that aim to mold them to not only achieve the MDGs, but to also become the 
perfect neoliberal subject (Power 2003:774). 
The governmentalities of partnerships, responsibilization and benchmarking are 
powerful techniques which are riddled throughout the MDG framework. Although they 
each offer separate forms of governance, they also work together and strengthen each 
other’s presence within the MDGs. Partnerships provide an open, egalitarian and 
inclusive system which responsibilizes nations and subjects in order to achieve the 
benchmarks of the MDGs. The compatible and harmonious relationship among these 
three governmentalities fortifies the neoliberal governing structures of millennial 
development. I have demonstrated their governing power throughout this chapter via 
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empirical and theoretical analysis. To gain a thorough understanding of these neoliberal 
governmentalities of millennial development, the following chapter will provide a case 
study of Namibia and its Vision 2030 policy in order to examine how the global 
framework of the MDGs reshapes Namibian policy, and Namibian citizens, into 
becoming the ideal neoliberal subject, free from poverty and underdevelopment. 
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Chapter 4: 
Namibia and Vision 2030: “the elusive quest for development”39 
 
In order to work towards the global elimination of the poverty and underdevelopment put 
forth by the MDGs, individual countries are to adopt and implement an MDG-based 
development strategy. Namibia is one among the many countries that has created a 
poverty reduction strategy within its national context. Vision 2030 was formulated in 
order to “improve the quality of life of the people of Namibia to the level of their 
counterparts in the developed world, by 2030” (npc.gov.na: Preface:9). This clear and 
definable framework is to guide Namibia on its path to development and improvement. 
The policy was formulated to act as a “broad” and “unifying vision” in order to guide the 
country through its numerous National Development Plans (NDPs), and to “provide 
direction to government ministries, the private sector, NGOs, civil society, regional and 
local Government authorities” (ibid:9). In order to achieve an improved quality of life for 
Namibians by 2030, the Vision works through the concepts and practices of partnerships, 
responsibilization and benchmarking. This chapter will provide an analysis of these 
techniques and demonstrate the influence of millennial development frameworks upon 
developing countries like Namibia, and the power these neoliberal discourses have within 
its development practices. A case study of Namibia’s Vision 2030 policy will display how 
the neoliberal discursive practices of partnerships, responsibilization and benchmarking 
                                                 
39 Wai, Zubairu. 2007. Whither African Development? A Preparatory for an African 
Alternative Reformulation of the Concept of Development. Africa Development, v32(4), 
pp.71–98. Quote found on page77. 
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work as governmentalities of millennial development, in that they aim to transform 
spaces and individuals into becoming the perfect neoliberal subject.  
Numerous development programmes have been implemented in Namibia40, 
however the country continues to be wracked by poverty; “close to 35 percent of the 
population lives on less than US$1.00 per day…nearly 56 percent lives on less than 
US$2.00 per day [and] income inequalities are among the highest in the world, with a 
Gini coefficient of 0.70.” (Central Bureau of Statistics 2008:xiii). Due to these 
unfortunate circumstances, the country continues to implement various development 
programmes and works with and through the “novel” methodologies and practices of the 
MDGs. Much like the MDGs, Vision 2030 is not “new” in its policies; it is based on 
numerous years and previous development frameworks. It is through the failings of 
previous National Development Plans (NDPs), that Vision 2030 has been implemented 
and legitimized. Namibia is currently working with and through its third plan, NDP3, 
which spans a five year period (2007/08-2011/12). The major theme for NDP3 
“Accelerating Economic Growth and Deepening Rural Development”, has been 
influenced not only by lessons learned from the previous NDPs, but also the South West 
                                                 
40 Programmes have focused on watershed management,  information and 
communication infrastructure, ICT distance learning and various education projects, local 
governance and development, AIDS prevention, sustainable development (plants and 
wildlife conservation), etc. (The International Development Research Centre “Projects in 
Namibia”. Accessed on February 28, 2011. <http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-83058-201-1-
DO_TOPIC.html>). For a list of all of the development projects in Namibia please visit 
<http://www.devdir.org/files/Namibia.PDF>. 
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Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) 2004 Party Election Manifesto, the directions 
from a November 2005 Cabinet Retreat, as well as the MDGs 
(http://www.nhcdelhi.com/Vision.html).  
Taking previous failures into account, as well as considering the development 
framework of the MDGs, Vision 2030 describes development as meeting the needs of the 
present, by encouraging responsibility, partnerships between all sectors of society, and 
working to achieve set targets and goals within the following elements: “inequalities and 
social welfare; peace and political stability; human resources, institutional- and capacity-
building; macro-economic issues; population, health and development; natural resources 
and environment; knowledge, information and technology; and factors of the external 
environment” 41 (npc.gov.na: chapter 3:38). Formulated with the technical assistance 
from the World Bank and the financial assistance from the UNDP, these practices aim to 
significantly reduce the amount of poverty within the country.  
Poverty in Namibia is understood as a consequence of high rates of 
unemployment due to population growth, rural to urban migration, as well as the inability 
of the economy to expand, or to sufficiently absorb, the needs of the unemployed and 
unskilled workforce (Frayne 2004:490). Viewed strictly from a technocratic standpoint, 
poverty in Namibia can be reduced through education and the creation of relevant jobs in 
order to produce a knowledge-based society and economy. The contextually specific 
forms of poverty within Namibia have been erased, but they are important to 
acknowledge, since the country still feels the effects of its colonial past in the form of the 
                                                 
41 For a list of all of the targets of Vision 2030, please see 
<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf> pp.61-84. 
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socio-economic divides that occur along regional-ethnic42 as well as class lines (Melber 
2005:306), yet Vision 2030 speaks nothing of, or to, these issues.  
Namibia is a former colony of South Africa. The segregationist laws of South 
Africa’s Apartheid system were present in Namibia from 1915 through to 1990. 
Apartheid is well known for its racial oppression and its divisive and marginalizing 
tactics as seen in the notions of separate development and self-rule. African reserves 
(Bantustans) were introduced during this time in Namibia. Laws were introduced which 
“made it almost impossible for any black person to move outside of those reserves 
without formal permission from the governing authority”, meaning that the black 
community was dispossessed of land, and disrupted from their socioeconomic and 
political traditional systems (Frayne 2000:54). The high concentration of people in the 
tight confines of the Bantustans led to the depletion of natural resources (i.e. soil erosion, 
deforestation, poaching and over-fishing) forcing local Namibians into wage labour 
(Lapeyre 2008:3) which created “a pool of ready labor…for use on the white commercial 
farms; in the mines, both locally and in South Africa; and in the towns as industrial, civil, 
and domestic labor...” (Frayne 2000:54). This form of systemic discrimination led to the 
denial of access to basic services for the majority of the population (African 
                                                 
42 The 2008 review of poverty and inequality found stark levels of inequity along racial 
and ethnic lines, for example, poverty is particularly widespread where Khoisan and 
Rukwangali languages are spoken. The poorest rural households spend an average of 
about N$104 per person, per month, compared to N$5,744 in rich urban households. The 
wealthiest fifth of the population accounted for 78.7% of income while the poorest fifth 
of the population lived on 1.4% of the total income (Jauch et al 2009:36). 
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Development Bank 2009: xv). The apartheid structure has influenced the current 
developmental, economic and environmental degradation of the country.  
Gaining its independence in 1990 meant that Namibia inherited a highly 
segmented society and economy. Namibia’s history with colonialism and the apartheid 
has affected the majority of the population who continue to experience marginalization 
and poverty. The dominance of South Africa has been and continues to be a major 
impediment to Namibian development. The imperialistic practices of South Africa can be 
seen in its “monopoly control over the Namibian market through dumping, over pricing 
of intermediate inputs, and restrictive purchasing policies” (Klerck 2008:358) which has 
produced various barriers for Namibians in their economic activities and developments 
(Knutsen 2003:555). South African firms undercut prices and (un)intentionally prevent 
local Namibian firms from starting production which in turn maintains their dominance 
over the region (ibid:566). These South African chain stores repatriate their surpluses, 
leading to zero financial investment in the local community (ibid:568). According to one 
Namibian black entrepreneur, “development is coming in, but mostly from the outside. 
There is growth, but the income is going out again” (ibid:580). For example, economic 
activity created in Namibia through the country’s decentralization policy has come in the 
form of South African chain stores which has created permanent jobs in the civil service 
and temporary jobs in construction (ibid:580). Although economic activity and 
consumption in Northern Namibia has increased, Knutsen doubts whether this contributes 
a positive net effect to employment since chain stores tend to out-compete the local stores 
and employ fewer workers (ibid:581). She discusses two general patterns emerging: 
“increases in consumption imply increasing imports rather than local production” 
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(ibid:581); and “networks are largely outward-oriented” in the sense that links to South 
Africa have gained in importance due to tough price competition which “requires 
‘everybody’ to have direct access to the suppliers” (ibid:581). Rather than considering 
this very particular and quite significant contextual issue, the MDG-based development 
strategies of Vision 2030 understand the prevalence of Namibian poverty as a lack of 
education and/or poor education system, poor governance, corruption, and unequal 
resource distribution (i.e. land and finances)43 (Albinus 2010). It is these series of 
localized lacks associated with poverty that legitimizes and depoliticizes millennial 
development policies and practices.  
Considering the policy’s main desire is to eradicate poverty though (economic) 
growth and social justice measures, it is shocking that there is so little discussion of 
poverty. There is one brief mention of Namibia’s understanding of poverty, located 
within its 2004 MDG Report. According to this report, the Namibian government 
                                                 
43 Although this last point is quite important with regards to the causes of Namibian 
poverty, since Albinus (2010) states that unequal distribution of income "can cause 
unethical behaviour such as prostitution”, crimes such as robberies and fraud, as well as 
“increase the spread of HIV/AIDS because low-income earners try to acquire extra 
income through prostitution…”, and increase the prevalence of “teenage and unplanned 
pregnancies, alcohol and drug abuse”, it is up to the individual to fix the problem of 
unequal distribution through having smaller family sizes to reduce medical, educational 
and food costs for parents, as well as attending affordable education and training 
institutes. 
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understands poverty as “a phenomenon of multiple dimensions”, which entails such 
issues as deprivation of essential needs (i.e. health, knowledge, standard of living). 
However, even with this acknowledgement, the Namibian government places its 
emphasis upon lack of income, or monetary poverty, because “income and money are 
extremely important for accessing basic amenities such as food, shelter and clothing” 
(http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf:5). This technocratic focus upon the 
monetary dimensions of poverty depoliticizes the issue of poverty and its multiple 
dimensions. Rather than considering the larger structural issues that hinders a person’s 
health, access to knowledge, or achievement of a high standard of living, the 
monetary/technical portrayal and understanding of poverty subjects individuals to 
specific types of programs, calculations and interventions, dictated by supranational 
institutions and development experts. Implemented through partnerships, 
responsibilization and benchmarking, these ideas, practices and initiatives may not 
always provide the solutions needed and may possibly complicate matters further due to 
its decontextualized emphasis on transforming developing states and individuals into 
becoming neoliberal subjects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Partnerships and Namibian Development 
“one of the major principles upon which our Vision is based is ‘partnership’”
44 
 
Working with and through the UN MDG framework, Namibia has come to incorporate 
the practice of partnerships within its Vision 2030 policy, as well as within its overall 
approach to development. The UNDP has influenced Namibia’s view of the importance 
of partnerships by claiming that it “hold[s] great promise for improved efficiency 
regarding service provision and resource management” (Gov.of Namibia and UNDP 
2002:18), therefore the Government of the Republic of Namibia has in turn placed high 
importance on the development of partnerships within their Vision 2030 policy:  
One of the major principles upon which [the] Vision is based is ‘partnership’. 
Partnership is recognised as a major prerequisite for the achievement of dynamic, 
efficient and sustainable development in the country. This involves partnership 
between government, communities and civil society; partnership between 
different branches of government, with the private sector (the business 
community), non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations 
and the international community; partnership between urban and rural societies 
and, ultimately, between all members of Namibian society  
(npc.goc.na: Forward:11).  
Partnerships imply that Namibia take on the role of an empowered, self-disciplined 
member of development, capable of implementing development strategies that aim to 
                                                 
44 Government of the Republic of Namibia. 2004. Namibia Vision 2030: Policy 
Framework for Long-Term National Development (Summary), pp.9. 
<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>.  
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fulfill the goals of the MDGs. The Vision 2030 initiative “promote[s] and nurture[s] 
partnerships” which are believed to “help…unify all Namibians to achieve their long-
term development needs and initiatives…” (ibid: Preface:16), as well as “create synergy” 
among and between Government and civil society partners (ibid: Chp.4:131). The 
objective of Namibian partnerships is to ensure the guidance of government and civil 
society by a comprehensive policy framework and to ensure proper and efficient 
spending of scarce resources (ibid:131-132). I believe that this emphasis on 
empowerment and ownership is what makes the practice of partnerships such a unique 
rationality of governance within millennial development practices; rather than discussing 
the relationships and roles of the multi- and bilateral partners, the partnerships of 
millennial development promote country-based strategies and country-led growth. 
In order to ease the partnership process in the country, the Government of 
Namibia formulated a Partnership Policy (NPC 2005:i). The policy was implemented 
with the financial support from the French and German government. An Advisory 
Committee was developed consisting of the National Planning Commission Secretariat 
and representatives of community organizations “to ensure the full participation of all 
stakeholders in the policy formulation process” (ibid:i). The aim of the policy is to 
produce a “working partnership for the entire country, its citizens and their 
organizations…” which will allow community organizations to fully utilize their 
capacity, advocate on behalf of the people, and promote national development (ibid:i). 
Rather than controlling the activities of these organizations, this policy, reflecting the 
goals of Vision 2030, will instead “provide a comprehensive framework to guide their 
operations and to harmonise their activities in order to complement the developmental 
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efforts of the Government” (ibid:ii). This policy works to connect the local to the global. 
Bringing together the multiple and various community organizations under the guidance 
of the government, who is then under the guidance of donors, the MDGs, as well as other 
development initiatives, allows for the implementation of international norms and values 
at the local level. The inclusive nature of this partnership policy creates compliance 
within the community and government. 
The practice of partnerships has seduced participants into believing they are either 
in control of the process or stand on level ground with dominant or prevailing 
development partners. Considering the historical context of Namibia, partnerships have 
become particularly desirable; the influence of “community”, “village” and “local 
people” within millennial development partnerships and projects are in fact used in order 
to counter accusations of neocolonialism (Power 2003:55). Due to its egalitarian nature, 
partnerships are considered to be “a classic example of one of the ‘plastic’ words of 
development” in the sense that the ownership that is attributed to the recipient state is still 
highly influenced by, and directly involves, agencies and/or donor nations telling the 
recipients “how their development should proceed” as well needing approval and funding 
throughout the implementation process (ibid:55-56). 
Framing partnerships as a country-led strategy normalizes the presence and 
practices of development partners in Namibia. Some of these partners include UNDP, 
UNFPA, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, ILO, UNESCO, UNAIDS, UNHCR, alongside the EU, 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, United States, United Kingdom and France (UNDAF 
2005). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) contributes to Namibian 
development in its contribution to developing a new Country Programme Framework 
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(CPF) in order to “identify…priority areas and planning opportunities” (ibid:32). The 
IAEA emphasizes and encourages national government ownership over the planning and 
implementing process, and to incorporate the development initiatives into UN 
development frameworks (ibid:32). Finnish development assistance entails a bilateral 
project which aims to support the various Namibian ministries and councils throughout 
the decentralization process. Alongside bilateral agreements, this partnership entails the 
cooperation between Namibian and Finnish NGOs as well as other multilateral 
programmes, in order to reduce poverty in the country. Finland attempts to reduce 
poverty by working through UN frameworks and standards, such as attending to civil 
society development, social and gender equality, as well as participation of civil society 
and increased linkages in trade and investment (ibid:38). These partnerships, which 
emphasize cooperation and ownership, work within larger UN frameworks that guide the 
relationships between the partners as well as the aid provided by the donors. Emphasizing 
the importance of the local in the development process, alongside the benefits of 
partnerships, normalizes the increasing presence of these organizations and institutions in 
the country.  
Partnerships have opened up new spaces for NGOs to have substantial input into 
policy making and development. Alongside the multiple international organizations 
located within Namibia, there are also multiple NGOs which have developed within the 
country to address ongoing and existing development needs as well as “facilitate 
international cooperation and knowledge sharing in development work…” 
(http://www.nonprofitexpert.com/countries/namibia.htm). Some of the organizations 
which have become involved in this partnership process are: Ecumenical Women of 
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Namibia, Guardian Angels Safety Patrol, Human Rights and Documentation Center, 
Institute for Management and Leadership Training, International Youth Society National, 
Khomas Women in Development, Legal Assistance Center, Sister Namibia, The Rössing 
Foundation, and Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa45(ibid). 
Partnerships are emphasized in Vision 2030 because they will enable states and 
communities “to play an active role in issues that concern them…[It] builds community 
pride and promotes ownership…” (NPC 2005:10) as well as “facilitate[s] international 
cooperation and knowledge sharing in development work, both among civil society 
organizations, research institutions, governments and the private sector” 
(http://www.nonprofitexpert.com/countries/namibia.htm). For example, the Guardian 
Angels Safety Patrol, which is affiliated with Guardian Angel Safety Patrol, USA, 
focuses on crime prevention, youth control and development. They approach, and provide 
assistance to, those in need (homeless, abused, etc.) by taking them to relevant 
organizations, shelters or rehabilitation centres (ibid). USAID, an independent federal 
government agency, “supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances 
U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting: economic growth, agriculture and trade; 
global health; and, democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance” in 
Namibia (ibid). Africare is another example of the many partnerships located throughout 
the country. Founded by Africans and Americans, the organization promotes “self-help 
development programs” and “places communities at the center of development” by not 
only consulting with active communities, but also forming partnerships with other local 
                                                 
45 Please see http://www.nonprofitexpert.com/countries/namibia.htm for further 
information on these NGOs as well as a list of other NGOs in the country. 
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organizations (http://www.africare.org/our-work/index.php). Africare focuses on the 
following areas: agriculture and food security; health; sanitation and hygiene, 
humanitarian assistance; women’s empowerment, civil society development and 
governance; microenterprise; and the environment. By working within these areas, 
Africare aims to “build sustainable, healthy and productive lives and communities…” 
(ibid). These partnerships invest countries with goals and a sense of “self-understanding” 
and invite nations and subjects to “participate voluntarily in various programmes to 
improve…and help themselves” (Abrahamsen 2004:1463). The ultimate aim is for 
Namibia to be a “stakeholder” in the “identity, project design and implementation” of the 
development programme (Nekwaya 2007:23). However, these programmes are created 
and implemented by foreign donor states and/or agencies, and work through specific 
frameworks, in order to promote growth and development deemed acceptable by global 
agents and standards.  
It is also important to note the presence of corporations, investments and loans in 
the partnership process. In 2007, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) approved a Development Policy Loan for Namibia for U.S.$7.5 
million in order to develop and implement specific and detailed development and reform 
policies representing a method of governing “beyond the state” (Ilcan and Lacey 
2011:130). Complementing this strategy, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has 
provided small investments, which include “a fisheries project (Pescanova), equity in the 
country’s first indigenous life-insurance company (Namibia Life), and a loan to build a 
Best Western hotel in the North” (ibid:130). Development partnerships are not only an 
instrument to implement governing techniques and practices, such as “self-disciplinary or 
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enforcing standards to prepare for a new path of development…” (ibid:130), but they are 
also a money-making venture46. For example, conservancies in Namibia were created in 
order to “stimulate the private sector and develop rural communities…” (ibid:132) The 
Ministry of Environment and Tourism introduced the legislation in 1996 which “gave 
conditional use of wildlife to communal areas that formed a ‘conservancy,’ or 
management unit” (ibid:132). By the end of 2006, there were fifty conservancies 
throughout the country (ibid:132). Local communities are fully engaged in this tourist 
industry, partnering with the established tour operating companies, which generates 
significant amounts of income in the form of lodges and resorts built by and with local 
material and knowledge, as well as wild gaming and trophy hunting (ibid:133-134). Ilcan 
and Lacey describe this process as representing the “contractualization of development” 
whereby development now “engages businesses, NGOs, government, and international 
organizations” and implements devices such as “performance indicators, contracts, 
competition, and budgets” (ibid:135). The presence of businesses and corporations in the 
partnership process not only demonstrates the influence that neoliberalism plays upon 
and within partnerships (as seen in the promotion of and focus on competition, best 
practices, fiscal generation and management, etc.) but it also demonstrates the validity 
and importance of examining the governmentalities of millennial development, for 
                                                 
46 For example, in September 2009, a report was released stating “a small but elite group 
of businesspeople and companies, most of whom are closely associated with SWAPO, 
have emerged as the beneficiaries of concessions awarded over seven prime Namibia 
Wildlife Resorts Company (NWR) from September 2007” accessing in total of 
$300,000,000 (Grobler 2009).  
82 
 
governance is no longer solely the practice of government, but it is a method and 
technique which can be implemented by multiple and various institutions and 
corporations. 
It is difficult to understand how underdeveloped and poverty stricken regions and 
individuals can be involved, or seen as equal partners in development projects. For 
example, in the region of Okavango 93 per cent of the population is considered poor or 
severely poor. In Ohangwena, it is 64 per cent (Central Bureau of Statistics 2008:9). It is 
interesting to note that of all the major development projects located in Namibia, it 
appears that only one is located in Ohangwena47, while none are located in Okavango 
(Directory of Development Organizations 2010). It is therefore not difficult to understand 
that partnerships in Namibia, although portrayed as consisting of harmonious 
relationships, are viewed with “mistrust, suspicion, ignorance, confusion, and 
misunderstandings…” (Hunter & Keulder 2010:90) because of the limited consultations 
with society. The effects of implementing decontextualized policies and programmes 
have meant that “poor people and critical voices have been sidelined or marginalized…” 
(Abrahamsen 2004:1457). This has been made evident in the partnership policies that 
promote and implement programmes which aim towards social transformation (i.e. 
educational attainment and achievement, entrepreneurial training, etc.) rather than 
structural acknowledgement and transformation. For example, the Partnership for 
                                                 
47 This is a pilot project funded by the Agropolis Foundation that focuses on agriculture, 
food, biodiversity and the environment (Directory of Development Organizations 2010).  
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Economic Growth Programme commissioned by BMZ48, and executed by Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Regional and Local Government, 
Housing and Rural Development, and the National Planning Commission, provides “the 
basic prerequisites for sustainable economic growth” such as financial and non-financial 
services, and business strategies. However the programme focuses specifically on 
microfinancing projects in order to stimulate economic activity and community growth 
and development (http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/afrika/namibia/16992.htm). This 
organization works within a technocratic development framework in that it focuses 
specifically upon business/economic activities and finance, rather than larger systemic or 
structural issues. As evidenced by Kotir and Obeng-Odoom (2009) in their case study of 
microfinance projects in Ghana, many of these projects which focus on finance tend to 
worsen the situation, rather than alleviate it. Implementing programmes and projects 
generated from partners abroad, not only decontextualizes the experience and cause of 
poverty in Namibia, but it also acts as a hindrance to development and poverty alleviation 
projects as well as obscures covert expressions of the power of development partners 
(Mercer 2003:759).  The fact that poverty continues in the region, at severe levels, 
maintains the power of partners in this country due to the need to implement new and 
improved development strategies.  
Partnerships portray poverty in Namibia as a self-inflicted problem. Although 
donors provide funding and guidance on proper forms of development, none of it will 
work if Namibia does not follow these practices. They must take ownership of policy 
                                                 
48 Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung is a German 
development organization. 
84 
 
implementation and reform, and take blame for the failures (Goldsmith 2011:159). This 
has been clearly stated within the Vision 2030 policy: the aim of partnerships is to “move 
from a view that it is the state or government alone that is responsible for sustainable 
development, towards one that sees responsibility with society as a whole – a full 
partnership, where the state helps to create the enabling environment for sustainable 
development and society makes its contribution…” (http://www.tech.na/download/ 
Vision2030.pdf: 86). Acting as a neoliberal governmentality of development, 
partnerships are informed by “market-driven truths and calculations” and work through 
multiple and various regimes, which generate particular concepts that inform “free” states 
and individuals of the need to self-manage and to work within the “principles of 
discipline, efficiency, and competitiveness” (Ong 2006:4). It is through the 
implementation of partnerships that states, as well as individuals, become involved in the 
process of development. The individual—the Namibian citizen—has now become 
responsible to meet the need and demands of their community, their state, their national 
development framework, and the MDGs. 
 
Responsibilizing Namibians 
“nation-building will be both a private sector (including civil society) and public 
responsibility”
49 
 
In order to fulfill the goals of both the MDGs and Vision 2030, the Prime Minister calls 
on “all Namibians and [their] neighbours and partners around the world to rally behind 
                                                 
49 Government of the Republic of Namibia. 2004. Namibia Vision 2030: Policy 
Framework for Long-Term National Development (Summary), pp.77. 
<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>. 
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[the] Vision, build on [their] freedom and make [their] dream of a prosperous 
Namibia…come true” (http://www.undg.org/archive_docs/7564-Namibia_MDG_ 
Report.pdf: i). Namibians are encouraged to “take responsibility for their own 
development and promote development activities that address the actual needs of the 
people and which require increasing community contributions to develop services and 
infrastructure” (ibid:13-14). The technique of responsibilization located within Vision 
2030 calls not only upon larger governmental and developmental agencies, but it also 
calls upon “all Namibians”, in the sense that Namibians are not only to be involved in the 
development process, but they are also to be molded, into becoming responsible, self-
disciplinary, citizen-subjects. Vision 2030 promotes and emphasizes throughout various 
government institutions and civil society, that it is the duty of individuals to provide the 
services, gain the educational qualifications, or engage in particular forms of conduct, 
that are needed to achieve the goals of Vision 2030, because “people are the nation’s 
human wealth” (npc.gov.na: Forward:9). 
The emphasis on responsibilization in development policies has strongly 
influenced ways of thinking about and producing structural changes. The Namibian 
economy has been experiencing high levels of unemployment, business failure and job 
loss. The failure rate hovers around eighty-five per cent (Asemota and Asemota 2008:1). 
Vision 2030 emphasizes that structures be put in place in order to stimulate 
entrepreneurship activities: training, financing and incentives are to be implemented since 
it is believed that businesses fail due to the lack of skilled workforces and poor work 
ethics (ibid:1-2). With this is mind, the Government of Namibia adopted the Strategic 
Interventionist Model which is to ensure “training, research, finance, marketing, know-
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how, and support to small businesses” in order to create jobs and expand the economy 
(ibid:2). Alongside this model, the African Development Bank established the National 
Centre for Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Technology (CEIT) in order to enhance 
“innovation, entrepreneurship and technology adaptation in Namibians” (ibid:2). 
Complementing both programmes, the Polytechnic of Namibia and the Community 
Colleges for International Development (CCID) established the Entrepreneurship and 
Workforce Development Project in Higher Education, which aims to “enhance skills base 
for industry and support initiatives for small businesses to alleviate poverty” (ibid:2). The 
Namibian development framework appears to be (overwhelmingly) in control of the 
conduct of individuals by emphasizing the need to build upon entrepreneurial skills. 
Working through the concept of responsibilization instills very specific understandings of 
poverty and poverty reduction. Rather than creating an environment that is open to 
various forms of input made by various members of society, these practices localize the 
issue of poverty by focusing on the lacks of the state and the individual.  
One of the key aspects of responsibilization is capacity building which will 
develop relevant skills to fulfill the needs of the nation, as well as the goals of both Vision 
2030 and the MDGs. Vision 2030 states that capacity building will allow Namibians to be 
innovative, willing, and able to commit to new challenges in this volatile neoliberal 
economy (npc.gov.na: Forward:11-12). Capacity building activities include “participatory 
and communication enhancement techniques, and knowledge training programs, [which] 
are often designed with the aim of assisting people to acquire particular skills and 
participate in activities that lead to social and economic change” (Phillips and Ilcan 
2004:393). Such activities will produce “a population of healthy, well-educated, skilled, 
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pro-active and financially stable people with a broad range of talents and positive attitude 
towards themselves, their fellow citizens, their country and global humanity” 
(npc.gov.na: Preface:14). This statement leads Namibians into believing that 
development is not only in “their hands”, but they are also a vital ingredient in the 
development process. In other words, the ability for individuals to mold themselves into 
self-regulating subjects, capable of meeting the criteria of Vision 2030, is a crucial aspect 
for the transformation of the country and the achievement of Vision 2030. According to 
the Government of Namibia, it is the responsibility and duty for all Namibians to be 
“healthy, brave, empowered, innovative, fully employed, confident and determined to 
succeed” because “everyone has a role to play, on a level playing field, unhindered by 
race, colour, gender, age, ability, ethnicity, religious affiliation or political inclination” 
(ibid:34). Portraying Namibia as an egalitarian society displays how Vision 2030 
undermines the inequalities and social and political divisions in the country. These 
discourses depoliticize the issue of poverty by placing blame on those who are truly 
unable to access such institutions or activities, due to actually existing financial, 
geographical, or socio-cultural barriers. The discrepancies located within these discourses 
are quite apparent, for not only do the poor exist, but they are actually increasing in 
number and severity.  
An explicitly local focus tends to highlight issues of gender, overcrowding, poor 
sanitation or political corruption as the causes of poverty, rather than the effects caused 
by the global market, access issues such as tariff and trade restrictions, or economically-
based development and adjustments (Craig & Porter 2005:239, Porter & Craig 
2004:398). For example, a UN document views Namibian poverty to be caused by some 
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of the following conditions: “low economic growth, high levels of unemployment… 
incapacity and loss of life due to HIV/AIDS and other diseases, inadequate access to and 
quality of education, and widespread environmental degradation” (UNDAF 2005:6). This 
apolitical framing is also prevalent within government rhetoric, in that the key threats to 
development within the country are “population growth and settlement patterns”, 
“increasing water stress”, “poorly planned development and inappropriate 
industrialization”, “the loss of biodiversity”, “unresolved land issues”, poverty and 
inequality, “wasteful consumption patterns”, “poor governance”, “underdevelopment of 
human resources”, disease, “limited research for development”, “unstable 
macroeconomic environment” (npc.gov.ca: chapter 6:176-177). The erasure of structural 
issues transforms poverty into a series of localized or individual lacks (education, health, 
improper local governing practices, etc.) that can be corrected by not only applying and 
implementing millennial development policies, but by transforming behaviours that are 
responsible for these deficiencies. Displacing the causes of poverty means the poor are 
now causes of and answers to poverty and underdevelopment.  
As a mechanism of neoliberal governance, responsibilization absolves the 
government from direct intervention in social service provision for society’s poorest 
citizens while (re)producing marginalization via personal accountability. What needs to 
be considered is that responsibilization does not promote or encourage individuals to 
question the political or economic context, instead, it reinforces the idea that individuals 
must work to conform to the ideal neoliberal citizen-subject in order to earn the benefits 
of a developed nation. It is a technology of agency. This type of rhetoric frames the 
unemployed, poverty-stricken and underdeveloped as “no longer simply victims, but 
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subjects to be empowered” (Abrahamsen 2004:1460). Individuals are responsible to 
develop themselves, and their nation. 
Responsibilization techniques have affected the way Namibians view poverty, in 
that it has become a desensitized and perhaps normalized aspect of the society. In 
President Pohamba’s speech at the first seating of cabinet this year, he stated the need for 
responsible individuals, and the “dire need of people who want to serve the country 
selflessly”, not selfishly in order to achieve riches, but to act selflessly “to serve others, 
without expecting much in return” (Nangolo 2011). Instead of material rewards, the 
responsible leader will be rewarded with “satisfaction” in seeing the “once marginalized, 
oppressed, hungry or unemployed, fending for themselves and subsequently assist others” 
(ibid). This is the ultimate call for the truly selfless, dedicated and responsible Namibian 
citizen; it should not matter what riches one has, or what one wants to acquire, for they 
are unimportant when compared to helping others help themselves. Rather than focusing 
on particular systemic and/or structural causes of poverty and underdevelopment, 
emphasis is placed on the role of the individual within all levels of Namibian society. 
Responsibilization not only localizes and depoliticizes the issue of poverty, it 
legitimizes the presence of development programmes and policies. Taking the high levels 
of poverty and inequality in Namibia into consideration, implementing policies and 
programmes that promote economic growth are not effective methods to reduce poverty. 
Many of the poor lack the resources necessary to engage in activities that will stimulate 
economic growth “thus creating a vicious circle in which low growth results in high 
poverty and high poverty, in turn, results in low growth” (Oyugi 2008:20). Therefore, the 
Namibian government implemented specific programmes which would work to improve 
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“the capacities of the poor”, molding individuals into becoming educated, high income 
earning, developed, responsible Namibians (ibid:20). Many of these programmes are 
located within training centers and academic institutions. These places offer 
entrepreneurship courses which have been portrayed as prerequisites for development. 
The Polytechnic of Namibia is currently revising its curricula to provide training 
programs and to foster the development of small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMME) 
which will in turn “enhance economic growth and reduce unemployment” (Ras 
2007:327). Taking these entrepreneurial courses will allow the poor to become innovative 
in their approach to problem solving, adapt “more readily to change”, become self-reliant 
and creative (ibid:329). It appears that this form of millennial thinking associated with 
Vision 2030 does not see a group of unemployed individuals who are unable to access the 
resources necessary for their advancement in society due to numerous structural barriers. 
Rather, these responsibilization techniques view the unemployed as “a promising site” of 
development and a solution to poverty (Ferguson 2007:74).  
The development strategies of Namibia’s Vision 2030 programme have reframed 
poverty so that it can be remedied through the implementation of particular technical 
treatments, specifically those pertaining to education and employment. In order to 
achieve the goal of becoming a “knowledge-based society” with limited amounts of 
poverty, individuals are to educate themselves in post-secondary school, vocational 
training centers (VTC), or vocational education and training programmes (VET) which 
will produce qualified individuals and establish a knowledgeable society (Mabizela 
2005:83, Bank of Namibia 2008a:1, Wallenborn 2009:550). Education and training are 
seen to play a vital role in the development of Namibia because they will provide crucial 
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values and skills necessary for economic development and a knowledge-based economy 
(Hayman 2007:373). The need for young people (ages 30 and under) to be educated is 
prevalent throughout Vision 2030 which describes the need for them to be “educated, 
skilled, motivated, confident, assiduous, responsible and healthy, and…empowered 
[granting them] ample opportunity to play an active role in shaping a better society, 
which will be their inheritance and their duty to sustain and manage in the future” 
(http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf: 21). It is the responsibility of the 
Namibian citizen to educate and train themselves, and to exude new values, in order to 
achieve the goals of the MDGs and Vision 2030. It is by attending these various 
educational programmes that individuals are molded into the desired citizen-subject. This 
is particularly evident in the approval by the Namibian Cabinet that all forms of 
education be aligned and hence molded to fit the economic needs of the country. In order 
to “steer” individuals, as well as academic institutions, into implementing, or attending 
such courses, (dis)incentives will be provided or implemented (ARB 2006:16966B). 
In order to achieve the goals of Vision 2030, people are required to be flexible and 
critical in their thinking, as well as “capable of adapting to new situations and demands 
and continuously learning from their own initiative” (http://www.tech.na/download/ 
Vision2030.pdf: 30-31). To take the initiative, and to be capable and flexible, are in fact 
“modes of subjectification” which encourage “an ethic of self-help”, in the sense that the 
poor are considered to be “active agents and not passive beneficiaries of development” 
(DiMuzio 2008:316). Educated and knowledgeable citizens are transformed into a 
responsible member of society who can and will provide “solutions to their problems and 
are made responsible for their own livelihood…” (ibid:316), and not rely on the 
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assistance or social services provided the government. Such practices are particularly 
seen in the curriculum of the Polytechnic of Namibia. The institution works within the 
framework of Vision 2030 in its desire to transform Namibia into a “winning nation” 
(Tjivikua 2010:2) by delivering relevant, high-quality programmes, aligned with market 
requirements and society’s needs (ibid:3). Students are responsible to seize the 
opportunity of enrollment within the academic institution (ibid:4). The current academic 
theme, “Re-thinking Competitiveness for Socio-Economic Development”, aims to 
“reshape [Namibia’s] ways of doing things” through knowledge production, and the 
creation of “knowledge workers”, allowing Namibians to be better able to “perform on 
the indicators” and hence “better [their] standard of living” (ibid:5). This institution 
launched a new entrepreneurship program, ProLearning, in March 2009. The program is 
geared towards “enabling the means” to create “more successful entrepreneurs in 
Namibia” (Myyrylainen 2009:2) and by reducing the amount of unemployment in the 
country (ibid:6). The program aims to specifically fulfill the goals of Vision 2030 by 
working to: promote the development of SMSEs; to provide business training to 
individuals in school and out-of-school; to encourage self-employment; “and to ensure 
that education and training programmes address the demands in the labor market” 
(ibid:6). What makes this programme particularly attractive is its new learning method 
that transforms the teacher into a coach, and shifts the responsibility of learning onto the 
active learner (ibid:50). Importance is placed on active participation, self-direction, 
responsibilization, and life-long learning (ibid:50). 
 Unfortunately even with such a well-organized framework, there are few 
entrepreneurial or educational success stories. For example, a “Start Your Own Business” 
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course at the Windhoek VTC, has been promoted as allowing individuals to learn what is 
needed in order to be a successful, contributing, member of society, however many 
trainees are unsatisfied50 with the amount of training received and believe it is 
insufficient to attain a job in their field (Marope 2005:49,73). This emphasis on 
entrepreneurial ventures has also affected the mining sector, which is the lead occupation 
within the country. Mining is described as a hindrance to long-term growth because it 
does not contribute to the knowledge sector. Yet, there is unemployment among those 
with post-secondary qualifications and there is evidence of VTC graduates dropping out 
of their studies due to a lack of jobs (Mabizela 2005:83, Bank of Namibia 2008a:1). 
There is also the issue of affording tuition. As noted, income is highly skewed in 
Namibia. The fact of the matter is that “unskilled” workers make about N$429 a month. 
Such a limited income excludes individuals from attending academic institutions and 
gaining the knowledge needed in order to access the benefits of economic growth (Klerck 
2008:361). Due to the specific focus on economic development, and the importance of 
education to achieve it, the poor will continue to remain excluded, not due to structural 
barriers, but due to “their” inability to “better” themselves. 
Responsibilization practices reposition the citizen within the governing 
development structure as an employable subject, or a “subject of government” (Fejes 
                                                 
50 According to Marope (2005), a study at the Windhoek found that “36 percent of the 
trainees dropped out before finishing their training. Most dropouts occurred in the first 
year (39%); 29 percent left in level two, 12 percent in level three, and 20 percent in level 
four” (Marope 2005:53). 
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2010:90)—someone who is capable of contributing to, or creating, the Namibian 
economy and becoming the ultimate neoliberal citizen-subject. The lack of available jobs, 
or the multiple barriers that Namibians may face while trying to enter into the economic 
sector, are erased and viewed as a matter of that individual’s employability, capability, or 
specialization. Responsibilization techniques work to normalize and depoliticize 
unemployment (ibid:90). The responsibility to be educated leads to the importance of 
adaptability, which is particularly important in the current volatile neoliberal economic 
structure. In order to be adaptable, one must train and re-train in order to stay 
employable, and hence, a proper and contributing member of the state (ibid:94). What 
legitimizes the neoliberal discourse of responsibilization in the Namibian context is the 
freedom, empowerment, and reflexive nature associated within and alongside it. This 
technique is a demonstration of the subtle nature of the practices of neoliberal 
governmentality, which see, shape and regulate the individual. In order to achieve this 
form of governance over the individual, particular devices are depended upon and 
emphasized, for instance schooling. These devices are promoted as a means to “create 
individuals who do not need to be governed by others, but will govern themselves, master 
themselves, care for themselves” (Rose 1996:45). Placed in a millennial development 
framework, new demands, knowledges, possibilities and subjects are produced, in order 
to achieve multiple and various time-bound benchmarks. It is the responsibility of the 
poor to achieve the national benchmarks of Vision 2030 and the global benchmarks of the 
MDGs. These benchmarks complement responsibilization techniques by creating 
divisions within the population, specifying those who are and those who are not capable 
or responsible enough (ibid:45) to achieve national and global demands.  
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Benchmarking Namibia 
“Vision 2030 is expected to…move the nation significantly up the scale of human 
development…”
51
 
 
International governmental organizations, along with international non-governmental 
organizations, governmental authorities and subnational bodies subject populations, 
particularly in developing countries, to continuous and comprehensive monitoring, 
regulations and controls (Merlingen 2003:368). These actions render Namibia’s 
underdevelopment visible through comparison with international institutional standards 
and countries. Depending on the outcome of the comparison, knowledge is generated, 
and statistics or benchmarks are implemented in order to correct, control, or advance, the 
progress of the space. Acting as a governing technique of millennial development, the 
benchmark “constitutes a field of visibility in which the observed are subjected to the 
power of the observers through their objectification in the form of archives and their 
constitution as cases” (ibid:369). Placed on a global level, these spaces are then 
hierarchically ranked, as “good” or “bad”, “on track” or “off track” (ibid:369). In 
Namibia, the two MDGs which focus on decreasing child mortality and enhancing 
maternal health, urgently “need more attention” alongside the “number of hurdles [that] 
still bar Namibia from attaining Vision 2030” such as “slow economic growth, high 
levels of unemployment, the fact that most exports are raw materials, the high 
dependency on imports…and HIV/AIDS” (Kisting 2010). These concrete examples 
which demonstrate how “off tack” Namibia’s development is, generates not only 
                                                 
51 Government of the Republic of Namibia. 2004. Namibia Vision 2030: Policy 
Framework for Long-Term National Development (Summary), pp.9.  
<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>. 
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competition but also pessimism and frustration due to the fact the country “lags behind”. 
Feeling the pressure of the upcoming deadlines of 2015, and 2030, has transformed at 
least one Namibian’s view (and possibly many others) of the current development 
structure, by pleading to “please deliver [Namibia] from Vision 2030” (Maletsky 2010). 
Implemented at a national level, Namibia faces pressure to demonstrate its 
willingness to abide by the goals and benchmarks of the MDGs, as well as to incorporate 
the goals into its national framework. The benchmarks of the MDGs are what constitute 
and guide Vision 2030, in the sense that Vision 2030 aims “to produce forecasts about 
future development possibilities for Namibia…[and] to see how some assumed future 
state would develop step by step…[by] provid[ing] a roadmap…” and defining 
“necessary actions” (http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf: 57) needed in order 
to develop. Vision 2030 sets out facts, objectives and targets, based upon those of the 
“developed” world, in order to determine and influence, economic growth, 
(re)distribution of income, socio-cultural development, land reform, education, 
HIV/AIDS, poverty, housing, employment and infrastructure development. These targets 
are to be achieved by Government, the nation, and all citizens who must contribute 
jointly to resolving these issues and rid Namibia of its “social evils” (i.e. tribalism, 
ethnicity, favourtism, corruption and crime) (Becker 2006:18).  
According to the UN and the Government of Namibia, in order to achieve the 
benchmarks of Vision 2030, community organizations need to not only be empowered, 
but they need to work within “an enabling and incentives-based environment” (Gov. of 
Namibia and UNDP 2002:18), whereby those who conform to the benchmarks are 
rewarded with funding. Emphasis is placed upon the achievement of the benchmarks 
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because it is believed that “foreign professional people and global businesses will 
perceive Namibia as a good environment in which to invest and from which to do local 
and international work, thus creating both wealth and employment” (npc.gov.na: 
Preface:14). Without the achievement of these goals, Namibia may in turn be stigmatized 
by the international community (Becker 2006:18) as a country that is unwilling or unable 
to develop. Conforming to the targets and deadlines generates rewards and not 
conforming (willingly or unwillingly) leads to punishment in the form of the redirection 
or halting of assistance, material support, and or investments (Abrahamsen 2004:1462). 
For example, complying with the quantitatively measured target of good governance52 
allows Namibia to receive funding from donors and investors (Shilimela and Naimhwaka 
2005:9-10). The Government has also implemented performance-based/output-based 
budgeting, in that they allocate funding to development projects “based on expected 
output or expected impact of the programme in the end” (ibid:11). Such practices display 
Namibia’s desire to appease global standards and processes of development. In fact so 
much pressure is placed upon the country and its citizens to conform to, and meet the 
goals of, both the MDGs and Vision 2030, that it is recommended that although “great 
value is…attached to Namibian tradition and culture…[some] cultural ideas and 
practices…tend to inhibit progress towards development targets, [so they] may be 
                                                 
52 Such practices entail: democracy, transparency, sustainability, accountability, 
equity/equality, and the practice of the rule of law as well as “ensur[ing] that government 
structures budget within available resources” and that the priority areas defined by 
government and donor partners are “given preference in budgeting” (Shilimela and 
Naimhwaka 2005:9-10) 
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sacrificed in the interest of the nation” (http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf: 
14). Transforming the culture of the nation and of its citizens demonstrates the power of 
the benchmark in international development—individuals can, should, and will conform 
in order to meet the goals of the nation and of the globe. 
The strict focus on achieving the quantitative goals of Vision 2030, rather than 
examining the much broader social and historical context of Namibia is but one example 
of the “dangerous obsession” of competition (Bruno 2009:265) associated with 
benchmarking. For example, Vision 2030 states that the Namibian economy must grow 
by seven percent GDP annually, however, the economy has only averaged four percent 
(http://www.nhcdelhi.com/Vision.html). The percentage is applied to a region that is still 
experiencing the effects of colonialism and socio-cultural and racial marginalization, as 
well as a transitioning economy from mining to a knowledge-based sector where little to 
no jobs are created and insufficient training is provided. These are but a few of the factors 
that are contributing to the current levels and experiences of poverty today in the region, 
and to the slow growth rate. This quite narrow, and “not socially that deep” (Porter & 
Craig 2004:392) method and interpretation of poverty and its reduction strategies may 
mean “neglect of the broader growth context” (Hayman 2007:379-81). It is 
“economically meaningless, politically misguided and socially damaging” yet the de-
politicized, impersonal and localized nature associated with the practice and rhetoric of 
“quantification”, “statistics” and “scientific objectivity” makes this technology of 
governance “consensual, desirable, and hence free of debate” (Bruno 2009:277-8). This 
form of “governing at a distance” aims to produce individuals who can “govern 
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themselves” through self-evaluation, self-observation and self-critique (Shore 2008:284) 
in order to meet the development needs of the nation and the world.  
The calculative practices within Namibia are now being used to measure, reform 
and improve the conduct of organizations and individuals all within the name of 
transparency and accountability. For example, some of the targets for education and 
training include: to expand access to secondary school education by 2006; to establish a 
coherent Vocational Education and Training Policy Framework by 2005; to have 
Vocational Training Centres established in all regions by 2003; to increase the amount of 
adult literacy to 100% by 2030 (http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf: 62)53. 
Implementing and working towards set benchmarks creates uniformity in the 
development plan, in that it does not allow for much variation within projects as seen in 
the need for the creation of a knowledge-based economy. Namibian schools have 
incorporated, and “seen a proliferation of technology-oriented degree-level courses” 
including Bachelors of Technology, Marketing Technology, Civil Engineering 
Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Bachelors of Technology,  and Human Resources 
Management, Technology, and Public Management (Marope 2005:56). Rather than 
working with, or even considering, local issues and needs, benchmarks are simply created 
and applied. Vision 2030 focuses specifically upon output targets, with little to no 
reference to contextual causes and/or factors. 
                                                 
53 According to UNICEF the total adult literacy rate (%) 2005-2008 was 88%, and the 
secondary school attendance ratio 2005-2009, net male was 40, female was 53 
(http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/ namibia_statistics.html). 
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The increasing influence and reliance upon calculative strategies within millennial 
development has created a global audit culture. This type of culture shapes the condition 
in which people or places exist through the use of modern calculative techniques and 
principles and has “become a central organizing principle in the governance and 
management of human conduct – and the new kinds of relationships, habits and practices 
that this is creating” (Shore 2008:279). Namibia’s “audit culture” is displayed through 
Vision 2030’s accompaniment within all levels of development planning and their 
monitoring of performance techniques, as well as influencing the design of future 
national development programmes and projects in the country. An Integrated Results 
Based Management approach has been introduced to effectively link Namibia’s National 
Development Plans to both the MDGs and Vision 2030 objectives by “linking public 
resources to performance and results, and continuous monitoring of performance through 
information management systems based on E-Government” (Bank of Namibia 2008b:14). 
The emphasis on growth-based models and benchmarks has, and will continue to have, a 
significant consequence upon those living in poverty in Namibia. Namibia and its citizens 
are to work to achieve the benchmarks set by Vision 2030, which include the need for 
economic growth rates of fourteen percent each year (even though forecasted economic 
growth rate in 2010 was to be around three percent). The Vision also aims to decrease 
unemployment rates to five percent (from the current fifty percent) as well as to have a 
more reputable Gini coefficient (Weidlich 2010). As stated, and as can be imagined, 
many Namibians lack the resources in which to fully and truly “participate” in or 
“contribute” to development, however these issues are not considered; the focus is on the 
achievement of the goals. The fact that Namibians are to dedicate themselves to the 
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achievement of these goals by 2030 (as well as 2015) is what guides and molds them into 
calculable, observable and governable subjects.  
The benchmarks of Vision 2030, inspired by those of the MDGs, play a major role 
in millennial development, aiding larger governing bodies to implement neoliberal 
rationalities of governance in Namibia, as seen in an emphasis on flexible and hence 
manipulable subjects that embody entrepreneurial and competitive behavior. As noted by 
the Bank of Namibia’s Governor, Tom Alweendo, “it is high time Namibians’ attitude on 
work ethics and entrepreneurship changed for the better, adding that more people should 
be ready to take risks when doing business” (Katswara 2007) in order to achieve the 
goals of Vision 2030. The specific implementation of global structures in Namibia, 
through Vision 2030, entails the shaping and normalizing of conduct, thought, decisions 
and aspirations in order to achieve the objectives which larger governing bodies consider 
desirable. Generating competition within and among developing countries in order to 
achieve a specified goal is not normal. This normalizing procedure “encourages or 
stimulates self-governance” through comparison, and “induces its objects to relate to how 
one should act in order to achieve best practice” (Fougner 2008:318).  
Acting as a neoliberal technique of millennial development, the benchmark aims 
to “govern human life” and to produce “a politics of subjection and subject-making that 
continually places in question the political existence of modern human beings” (Ong 
2006:13). In this sense, individual behavior is constantly questioned and challenged, and 
many times, the capability of the individual is measured against one’s ability to be a 
citizen. This technique of benchmarking complements the partnership and 
responsibilization practices of millennial development, in that the practices of partnership 
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and responsibilization aim to achieve the many benchmarks of millennial development. 
The quantitative and adaptable nature of the benchmark works to reform, regenerate and 
renovate the development process, as well as those located within it. Through this 
process, individuals, communities, states, and even the globe, can be measured and 
modified, through various other governmentalities in order to suit the needs of the current 
development framework.  
As an “an essential intellectual trait of Vision 2030” the combination of pro-poor 
development and socioeconomic justice on a national scale with the merciless neoliberal 
dictates emanating from the global framework of the MDGs “represent the reconciliation 
of the irreconcilable” (Winterfeldt 2007:66). Vision 2030’s aim to “improve the quality of 
life of the people of Namibia” through its themes of equality, social welfare, macro-
economic issues, health, and knowledge (http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf), 
will not work if it is to be accomplished through the neoliberal rationalities of 
partnerships, responsibilization and benchmarking; it will not equal justice in any region. 
The use and promotion of these terms are meant to stimulate economic activity, and 
failure to do so will be blamed upon irresponsible and unmotivated citizens, not the 
(un)intended effects of the all-encompassing structure of millennial development in the 
Namibian context.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
At this moment, there are now 4 years, 250 days, 2 hours, 18 minutes and 35 seconds, 34 
seconds… 33… until the year 2015. Time is passing. The countdown is on to realize how 
many people will achieve or fail in their ability to develop their country and to “make 
poverty history”. 2015 will be the time for nations to display how responsible they have 
been in working with and through MDG-based development frameworks, and how they 
are contributing to solving the world’s development issues by meeting quantifiable 
targets and deadlines. This framework envelops 189 countries and over 6 billion people.  
Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this thesis has demonstrated how and 
to what extent millennial development programmes have governed national development 
policies, and how in turn, those national policies have shaped the individuals it aims to 
develop, through the neoliberal techniques of partnerships, responsibilization and 
benchmarking. These techniques create and produce space and engage in politico-
economic and socio-cultural transformation due to their ability to manipulate, measure 
and manage poverty, and shape and direct individuals by producing remedies, expertise, 
and training. It is important to be aware of the neoliberal “moves” and discursive 
techniques of millennial development, for these practices govern the modern developing 
subject through the application of particular strategies, targets and goals. Promoted as 
“new” ways of knowing and conducting development, the MDGs govern the behaviour 
of individuals through self-reflection and self-mastery. Acting as “technical and 
institutional alignments”, the neoliberal governmentalities of millennial development 
generate global consensus, global ordering and global hierarchical arrangements (Craig 
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and Porter 2006:4). The ability to not only regulate life, but to also create subjects and 
citizens through a focus on subjectivities and aspirations, rather than through repression 
and control (Mosse 2004:644), is what makes the MDGs a technology of governance par 
excellence. In order to demonstrate this argument, this thesis addressed the question of 
how and to what extent millennial development programmes govern national 
development policies, and how in turn, those national policies come to shape the 
individuals they aim to develop.   
In order to analyze the neoliberal governmentalities of millennial development, 
and how these governmentalities shape the policies, practices and perceptions of poverty 
within the context of Namibia and its Vision 2030 policy, I worked with and through a 
governmentality framework. I have shed light on how millennial development practices 
and policies not only guide Namibia, and it Vision 2030 policy, which was formulated to 
“improve the quality of life of the people of Namibia to the level of their counterparts in 
the developed world, by 2030” (npc.gov.na: Forward:9), on its path to development and 
improvement, but to also transform this space into becoming the perfect neoliberal 
subject and steward. By examining the neoliberal techniques of partnerships, 
responsibilization and benchmarking, in the context of Namibia, I displayed how spaces, 
and the individuals within these spaces, are molded, monitored and shaped in order to 
complement and fulfill millennial development strategies, targets and goals. These 
governmentalities work to govern the actions of the poor and influence ideas of poverty 
and poverty reduction as well as legitimize the presence of development and government 
institutions, trained experts, and professional reformers, within developing regions. These 
neoliberal techniques and discourses of development portray poverty and 
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underdevelopment as a result of state-level and/or individual inabilities or incapacities 
and it is through this process that millennial development frameworks identify, produce, 
and transform these “problem” spaces into spaces of opportunity and places of 
possibility.  
Analyzing Vision 2030 through a governmentality lens allowed me to demonstrate 
how this vision works within and towards larger UN frameworks which guide the 
relationships between recipients and donors. Although the ultimate aim is for Namibia to 
be a “stakeholder” in the implementation of development practices, the path to 
development is heavily influenced and guided by foreign donor states and/or agencies, 
which work through specific frameworks, in order to promote growth and development 
deemed acceptable by global agents and standards. Namibians are lead into believing that 
development is not only in “their hands”, but they are also a vital ingredient in the 
development process. In other words, the ability for not only the state, but also 
individuals to mold themselves into self-regulating subjects is a crucial aspect for the 
transformation of the country and the achievement of the benchmarks of Vision 2030 and 
the MDGs.  
I believe this thesis will contribute to the limited but nonetheless valuable 
literature on the governmentalities and discourses of the MDGs by considering how the 
practices of partnerships, responsibilization and benchmarking are not only utilized by 
the MDGs at a global level, but how they permeate and transform national policies and 
understandings of poverty and shape the actions of those considered to be poor or 
underdeveloped. I am however, aware of the limitations of this framework and I 
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acknowledge the fact that Namibians are fully conscious of, and involved in, the 
modification and transformation of millennial development practices and programmes. 
Again, the goal of this thesis was not to condemn the MDGs, for they truly are 
calling global attention to issues that billions of people are currently experiencing. The 
goal was to understand the rationale behind millennial development policies, what it 
seeks to change, how it seeks to change it, the discourses and techniques it applies, and 
how these practices not only affect the populations at the receiving end of these policies 
and programmes, but also how our understanding of development and poverty reduction 
has changed. Being aware of these issues will allow actors in the development field to not 
only critique and challenge global development frameworks, but to perhaps find an 
alternative method to the relatively “new” framework of the MDGs, or an alternative 
understanding of the meaning of development. Or perhaps one will simply come to an 
understanding of what this practice has entailed and even currently consists of—
governance. However, with only 4 years, 250 days, 1 hour, and 59 seconds left to go, I 
fear we may be running out of time. 
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